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Jeffrey M. Anapolsky* and Jessica F. Woods**

Pitfalls in Brazilian Bankruptcy Law for
International Bond Investors

Abstract
This Article is a comparison of insolvency law in Brazil and the United
States focusing on the perspective of international bondholders. It contains a
discussion of Brazilian bankruptcy law reform, recognition of individual
bondholders in reorganization proceedings, organizing creditors, debtor exclusivity,
plan confirmation and voting rights, disclosure requirements, and asset sales.

I. Introduction
The Federative Republic of Brazil is the largest nation in South America and the
fifth largest in the world by geography and population.1 As it prepares for the 2014
World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, the Brazilian government is seeking nearly
$500 billion to invest in roads, ports, dams, and other infrastructure projects.2 In
addition, Brazilian corporations are issuing a record amount of bonds globally,
regularly comprising about 50% of total global bond issuance for Latin American
corporations (Chart 1).3 In 2012, Brazilian corporations issued a record $47 billion
of bonds, up from $6 billion in 2008, and are expected to comprise over 50% of
Latin American bond issuance in 2013.4
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** Jessica F. Woods, JD, is a 2013 graduate of the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
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1. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: BRAZIL, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2013).
2. Brian Winter, Brazil’s Olympics Will Be Fine. As for the World Cup. . ., REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2012, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/29/us-brazil-olympics-odebrecht-idUSBRE87S10H20120829.
3. J.P. Morgan, Latin America: 2012 Review and 2013 Outlook (Jan. 2013), at 19; see infra Chart I.
4. See supra note 3.
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While relatively high yields on Brazilian corporate debt appear attractive to
international investors, these investors may assume that, in the event of default,
Brazilian insolvency laws are similar to those in the U.S. In 2005, the Brazilian
government replaced its outmoded insolvency laws with an entirely new regime,
which bases its procedures for reorganization on chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.6 This reform has led to several positive developments with respect to creditor
recoveries in Brazilian corporate restructurings.7 However, there continue to be
several noteworthy differences between the U.S. and Brazilian insolvency systems
that may generate unwelcome surprises to U.S. holders of Brazilian corporate
bonds, including discrepancies surrounding: (i) the recognition of individual
bondholders’ claims;8 (ii) the ability of creditors to organize and retain legal and
financial professionals;9 (iii) the process and timeline for negotiating, voting on, and
confirming a plan of reorganization;10 (iv) the disclosure requirements for a
debtor;11 (v) the procedure for selling the debtor’s assets;12 and (vi) the roles of
courts and trustees in facilitating the insolvency process.13 Although investors may

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
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J.P. Morgan, Latin America: 2012 Review and 2013 Outlook (Jan. 2013), at 21.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006); see also infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
See infra Parts III–VII.
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understand that Brazil is experiencing corporate delinquency rates approaching
8.5% (Chart 2) as inflation remains around 5.5%,14 they may be overestimating
their rates of recovery after their investments become distressed. In addition, they
may not appreciate the out-of-pocket costs for professional fees and expenses as
well as the time commitment necessary for negotiating with insolvent debtors. This
Article will attempt to articulate some of the core differences between the U.S. and
Brazilian insolvency laws that have an adverse effect on international bondholders
and will suggest reform measures that would ameliorate these effects, thereby
encouraging growth in the Brazilian debt capital markets and overall economy.

II. Background on Brazilian Insolvency Law: 2005 Reform
After more than a decade of legislative debate, the Brazilian government revamped
its insolvency laws by enacting the Nova Lei de Falências e Recuperação de Empresas,
Lei No. 11.101 (the “Brazilian Bankruptcy Law”) on February 9, 2005.16 The new
law sought to modernize Brazil’s former insolvency statute, Decreto-Lei 7.661

14.
15.

CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 1; see also infra Chart 2.
J.P. Morgan, Brazilian Large Cap Banks: A Recap of Recent Trends and Outlook 9 (May 2013); see also
BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, https://www3.bcb.gov.br/sgspub/localizarseries/localizarSeries.do?method=
prepararTelaLocalizarSeries (last visited June 19, 2013).
16. Lei No. 11.101, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005 (Braz.),
translated in Turnaround Management Association do Brasil-TMA Brasil, Brazilian Bankruptcy Code (Feb. 9,
2005), http://tmabrasil.org/en/articles-and-news/brazilian-bankruptcy-code.
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(1945),17 which was highly criticized for stunting economic growth and contributing
to interest rates that were among the highest in the world.18 The pre-2005 law
involved alternative legal frameworks for reorganization (known as concordata)19
and liquidation (bankruptcy or falência).20 However, distressed companies were
rarely able to reorganize under the rigid concordata procedures, and, as a result,
many potentially viable companies were forced into bankruptcy.21 Once in
bankruptcy, procedural inefficiencies led to protracted cases,22 and successor
liability discouraged the development of a meaningful market for the sale of assets
in liquidation.23 Furthermore, the pre-2005 law prioritized claims in the following

17. Decreto-Lei No. 7.661, de 21 de Junho de 1945, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 21.6.1945
(Braz.) (repealed 2005), translated in http://www.translation-source.com/posts/brazilian-legislation-availablein-english).
18. See, e.g., Joaquim de Paiva Muniz & Ana Tereza Palhares Basílio, The New Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, 16
INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 225, 225 (2005) (“The inefficiency of [the prior] Brazilian insolvency rules ha[d]
severe negative impacts on the economy, to the extent that they adversely affect[ed] the spread in the interest
rates charged by financial institutions, which are among the highest in the world.”); see also GORDON W.
JOHNSON & DANIEL ALONSO, IMPACT OF GLOBAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ON LATIN AMERICA: REEXAMINING THE
FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST (Feb. 1, 2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/ConferenceMaterial/
20168306/LA%20Corporate%20Insolvency%20(Johnson).pdf (explaining the importance of insolvency laws
for a stable domestic economy and enumerating the shortcomings of Brazil’s former bankruptcy law).
19. Decreto-Lei No. 7.661, tit. X.
20. Id. tits. I–IX.
21. In a concordata, the debtor’s repayment plan had to be one prescribed by the bankruptcy statute; any
negotiation with creditors would result in any other creditor having the right to force the company into
bankruptcy, regardless of the debtor’s financial condition. Id. art. 150. A concordata applied only to unsecured
creditors. Id. art. 147. In its plan, the debtor could offer to pay its unsecured creditors either: 50% of its debt
immediately, 60% over six months, 75% over 12 months, 90% over 18 months, or 100% over 24 months, in
exchange for the full release of the debtor’s unsecured debt obligations. Id. art. 156. If the debtor submitted the
proper documentation and its plan met these legal requirements, the judge granted the concordata; creditor
consent was not at issue. Id. art. 161. If the debtor then failed to comply with the repayment plan, it was
declared bankrupt. Id. art. 150. Because a company filing for concordata could rarely pay 50% of its debts
upfront and negotiation between the parties was not permitted, often the concordata’s only effect was to
postpone payments, resulting in high default rates despite the company’s potential viability. Aloisio P. Araujo et
al., The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law Experience, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 994, 996 (2012); see also Luiz Fernando Valente de
Paiva, Understanding the Intricacies of Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, in BANKRUPTCY LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES IN
SOUTH AMERICA: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE SOUTH AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY PROCESS, WORKING
WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES 21, 24 (Michaela Falls ed., 2011),
available at 2011 WL 586859. As a result, the former law was enormously unsuccessful at providing corporate
debtors with a meaningful chance at reorganization. Indeed, 80% of companies in concordata were eventually
declared bankrupt and liquidated. Muniz & Basílio, supra note 18, at 231.
22. Under the former regime, bankruptcy proceedings in Brazil took an average of 10 years, more than
twice the average for Latin America. Muniz & Basílio, supra note 18, 225 n.2 (citing data gathered by economist
Gesner Oliveira, former President of the Brazilian Antitrust Agency); see also Araujo et al., supra note 21, Fig.1,
at 996.
23. Under the former regime, tax, labor, and other liabilities of an insolvent company were transferred to
the buyer of an asset sold in liquidation. The full amount of such liabilities was generally not known or able to
be estimated at the time of sale. See, e.g., Paiva, supra note 21, at 24–25. Successor liability made the acquisition
of a bankrupt company extremely unattractive to otherwise interested buyers, and depressed sale prices
reflected this risk. See, e.g., Muniz & Basílio, supra note 18, at 231 (explaining that “it was, in practice, unfeasible
to transfer troubled business[es] to healthier entities”). In addition, successor liability led to disposal of the

400

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Jeffrey M. Anapolsky & Jessica F. Woods
order: (i) labor claims, (ii) tax claims, (iii) secured claims,24 and (iv) unsecured
claims.25 Due to high labor and tax rates in Brazil, the debtor rarely had assets left
over to satisfy secured creditors, let alone unsecured creditors.26 In most insolvency
cases, secured creditors received nothing.27 As a result of these challenges, the
average recovery rate under the prior insolvency regime for creditors who did not
hold tax or labor claims was 0.2%, as compared with a 26% average creditor
recovery rate for Latin America as a whole28 and a 43% historical average senior
unsecured creditor recovery rate in the U.S.29 Investors demanded higher interest
rates to account for this inordinate amount of risk, eventually motivating the 2005
reform.30
The 2005 reform sought to rectify many of these fundamental defects, and
thereby improve Brazil’s credit market and overall economic health.31 To do so, the
2005 reform introduced a legal framework for debtors to negotiate directly with
creditors to restructure debts, eliminated successor liability,32 and demoted tax
claims to a priority level below that of secured creditors.33 The 2005 reform replaced
the concordata with two distinct methods of reorganization: recuperação judicial
(judicial reorganization), which involves a court-supervised insolvency

debtor’s assets in a piecemeal fashion, which generally translated to decreased proceeds and reduced recovery
for creditors due to the loss of, for example, value in the form of goodwill. Id. at 230.
24. There are generally three types of secured claims in Brazil: mortgage (real property), pledge (personal
property), and chattel mortgage (either real or personal property). See Thomas Felsberg, Rehabilitation and
Composition Schemes in Brazil, in COLLIER INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INSOLVENCY ¶ 16.02[1][a] (Alan N. Resnick
et al. eds., 2011).
25. Decreto-Lei No. 7.661, arts. 102, 124.
26. See, e.g., Paiva, supra note 21, at 25 (“Because labor claims and tax claims are frequently enormous in
Brazil, there were generally few assets remaining in a debtor’s estate to satisfy secured claims. As a result,
Brazilian lenders incurred tremendous losses due to loan defaults in bankruptcy.”). See generally Christopher
Andrew Jarvinen et al., The International Scene: Bankruptcy Reform Coming to Brazil, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 67,
67 (2005).
27. Muniz & Basílio, supra note 18, at 230.
28. Araujo et al., supra note 21, at 996 (defining the Latin American and Caribbean block as including
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela
for the purposes of this study).
29. STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS., RATINGS DIRECT: DEFAULT, TRANSITION, AND RECOVERY: U.S.
RECOVERY STUDY: RECENT POST-BANKRUPTCY RECOVERY LEVELS DISAPPOINT SENIOR UNSECURED BONDHOLDERS
3, 5 (2012), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Ratings_US/US_Recovery_Study_
Recent_Post_Bankruptcy_Recovery_Levels.pdf.
30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing high interest rates in Brazil); see also Araujo et al.,
supra note 21, at 996 (low creditor recovery rates in bankruptcy was “the main reason for the extremely high
interest rate spread in Brazil before the new law”).
31. See Jarvinen et al., supra note 26, at 69 (discussing legislative intent behind the reform).
32. Lei No. 11.101, arts. 60, 141, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005
(Braz.).
33. Id. art. 83. In addition, the new law caps the priority position of creditors with labor-related or
occupational accident claims at a value equivalent to 150 months of minimum wages per creditor; the
remainder of such claims are considered unsecured. Id.; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.03[9][e].
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proceeding;34 and recuperação extrajudicial (extrajudicial reorganization), which
involves an out-of-court insolvency proceeding.35 With respect to judicial
reorganizations (the focus of this Article), the 2005 reform retained the concordata’s
basic structure comprised of three creditor constituencies: labor creditors (Class I),
secured creditors (Class II), and a catch-all class generally populated by unsecured
creditors (Class III).36 The new law largely retained Brazil’s traditional framework
for bankruptcy (falência), which is analogous to a chapter 7 liquidation in the U.S.37
The new law also retained its pre-2005 concepts of fraudulent transfers, setoff,
preferences, automatic stay, and discharge, which are somewhat similar to those
found in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.38
To initiate an insolvency proceeding, a debtor must file a petition with the
Brazilian state civil court located in the jurisdiction of the debtor’s principal
establishment.39 In addition, for a Brazilian insolvency proceeding involving bonds
issued in the U.S., the debtor will likely need to initiate a chapter 15 proceeding in
conjunction with its filing of a petition for judicial reorganization in order to gain
U.S. recognition of the Brazilian court order.40 Brazilian creditors have a legal right
to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding, but not a judicial reorganization proceeding.41
Unlike in the U.S. where there are specialized federal bankruptcy courts in every
jurisdiction,42 most Brazilian states direct insolvency petitions to a court of general
subject matter jurisdiction.43 In such situations, which often occur outside the
capital of São Paulo, the judge may be superficially familiar with insolvency law
generally, have little experience with the 2005 reform, and have no experience with
a complex business insolvency involving international bondholders.

34. Lei No. 11.101, arts. 161–67 (Braz.).
35. Id. arts. 47–69. Extrajudicial reorganization is conceptually similar to a prepackaged chapter 11
proceeding in the U.S (though with many practical differences). Because extrajudicial reorganizations have been
extremely rare since the 2005 reform, this Article will focus on the more common process of judicial
reorganization.
36. Id. art. 41; see Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[7][b]. It is worth noting that the debtor must submit tax
liability clearance certificates before the judge may approve the reorganization plan. Lei No. 11.101, art. 57.
Thus, in effect, the government is not subject to a judicial reorganization, because a reorganization plan can
only be implemented if the debtor either has no tax liabilities or has negotiated an installment plan with the
government. Id. art. 68.
37. Compare Lei No. 11.101, ch. V, with Decreto-Lei No. 7.661, tits. I–IX, and 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84 (2006);
see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.02[2][c], 16.03.
38. See Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[1][a], [7], [8], [9][i].
39. Lei No. 11.101, art. 3; see Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[2], 16.04[2].
40. Enacted in 2005, chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code covers ancillary and other cross-border cases.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–8, § 801, 119 Stat. 23,
134–45 (2005) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–32).
41. Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[3], 16.04[3] .
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006) (granting exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction to federal district courts);
see also Understanding the Federal Courts: Bankruptcy Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/BankruptcyCourts.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (noting that
each of the 94 federal judicial districts handles bankruptcy matters).
43. See Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.03[2].
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Once in judicial reorganization, the court appoints a judicial trustee44 to work
with the debtor’s directors and officers, who remain in control of the business.45 The
judicial trustee monitors the debtor’s operating activities, presides over the general
meeting of creditors, provides summaries of the debtor’s books and records, and
performs other administrative duties.46
Thereafter, the debtor, its creditors, the judicial trustee, and the court must
observe several milestones for judicial reorganization that are subject to a strict
timeline as a matter of law.47 Chart 3 illustrates the overall timeline, which will be
discussed in detail herein.
Chart 3: Judicial Reorganization Timeline
Case/
Outcome
Deadlines
Varig, S.A.
sold to
investment
consortium

Deadline
Petition
Filed/
Publication Creditors'
Proof of
Accepted
of
Claim
Notice
by Court
-0
+15
6/17/05
7/12/05
7/27/05
ancillary
case filed
in U.S.on
same date

6/22/05
accepted
by Court
Independência 2/27/09
S.A.
Ch. 15
creditors
filed on
funded
same date
reorganization
5/12/09
accepted
by Court
Centrais
2/28/12
Elétricas do
Pará (CELPA) 2/29/12
sold to
accepted
Equatorial
by Court
Energia S.A.

5/13/09

5/28/09

3/7/12

3/22/12

48

Deadline Deadline Deadline Deadline
General
Deadline
Plan
Object to Court
Creditor
End of
Meetings
Court Deadline
Filing by Creditors' Approves Objection
Stay
Case
of
Confirms
Debtor
Claims
Claims
to Plan
Period
Closed
Creditors
Plan
+60
+70
+80
+90
+180
-+720
+135
9/12/05
9/20/05
9/30/05
10/10/05 10/13/05 adjourned
1/8/06
12/28/05
7/2/07
10/19/05 adjourned
plan filed
at
10/26/05 adjourned
deadline
10/31/05 adjourned
11/24/05 deadline
12/19/05 plan
approved
02/23/06 amendment
approved
7/13/09
5/3/11
11/9/09 11/19/09
7/22/09
8/3/09
8/11/09 9/25/09 deadline
plan filed
Ch. 15 liquidated
9/28/09 inadequate
at
order
attendance
after
10/5/09 adjourned
deadline
2/24/10
missed
10/19/09 adjourned
coupon
11/5/09 plan
in 2010
approved
5/7/12
plan filed
on 5/4/12

5/16/12

5/26/12

6/5/12

7/20/12
7/9/12
8/3/12
9/1/12

deadline
adjourned
adjourned
plan
approved

9/4/12

9/4/12
Ch. 15
order
12/12/12

2/25/14

11/9/12
Ch. 15
filed

Although the new law fails to address certain contemporary issues in insolvency
law, such as cross-border insolvencies,49 the 2005 reform represented a giant leap

44. Lei No. 11.101, art. 22; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[2][a], [4][b].
45. Lei No. 11.101, art. 64. However, officers and directors may be removed for cause. Id.
46. Id. art. 22; see Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.03[4][b].
47. Lei No. 11.101, arts. 5, 7, 53–74 (providing the requirements and timeline for judicial reorganization).
48. Id.; see In re Varig, S.A., No. 05-14400 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2005); In re Independencia
S.A., No. 09-10903 (SMB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2009); In re Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A. — Em
Recuperação Judicial, No. 12-14568-scc (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2012); Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of
Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A., No. 0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301 (13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29, 2012); Judicial
Reorganization in Brazil,
INDAPENDÊNCIA,
http://ir.independencia.com.br/independencia/web/conteudo
_en.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=25968 (last updated Nov. 13, 2009).
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forward in modernizing Brazilian insolvency law. A 2012 empirical study led by
Aloisio P. Araujo, Professor at the National Institute of Pure and Applied
Mathematics in Rio de Janeiro, found that the overhaul led to a number of positive
developments.50 The number of liquidation requests significantly decreased
immediately following the reform, creditor recovery rates increased from 0.2% to
17% by 2009, and the average time to close a business fell from 10 to 4 years.51 The
same study also determined that the 2005 reform materially reduced the cost of
debt financing due to the improved treatment of lenders52 and increased access to
debt financing for Brazilian companies.53 Data from the Brazilian Central Bank
(Chart 4) illustrates the following trends, which suggest that Brazilian companies
and their creditors increasingly recognize the 2005 reform to be a constructive
solution for corporate restructurings: (i) the number of judicial reorganizations is
growing in absolute numbers as well as relative to the number of bankruptcies; (ii)
for large businesses with revenues over 50 million Brazilian reais, which are most
relevant to international bondholders, 2012 insolvency filings were comprised of
approximately 80% judicial reorganizations and 20% bankruptcies (the proportion
for small and medium businesses was approximately 35%/65% and 67%/33%,
respectively); (iii) courts are most familiar with judicial reorganization cases
involving small and medium businesses with revenues under 50 million Brazilian
reais, but case law for large companies is steadily creating a foundation of applicable
legal precedent; and (iv) the judicial reorganization process is resulting in more
court-confirmed debt restructuring plans (as opposed to conversions to bankruptcy
for liquidation), although the percentage remains consistently below 50%.
Furthermore, a general rise in judicial reorganization filings since 2005 (Chart 4)
suggests that Brazilian companies and their creditors are increasingly recognizing
54
the 2005 reform to be a constructive solution for corporate restructurings. While
the 2005 reform dramatically improved Brazilian insolvency laws, several aspects
require further improvement to address practical capital market realities and
conform to international best practices.
49. Brazil did not adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency endorsed by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law in 1997. Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.05[4]; see also Thomas
Benes Felsberg & Paulo Fernando Campana Filho, Corporate Bankruptcy and Reorganization in Brazil: National
and Cross-border Perspectives in NORTON ANN. REV. OF INT’L INSOLVENCY 275, 299 (2011) (urging Brazil to
adopt laws regarding cross-border insolvencies).
50. Araujo et al., supra note 21, at 1000, 1004.
51. Id. at 996, 998.
52. Id. at 1004.
53. Id. at 995, 1004.
54. Indicador Serasa Experian de Falências e Recuperações, SERASA EXPERIAN, available at
http://www.serasaexperian.com.br/release/indicadores/falencias_concordatas.htm (last accessed June 19, 2013).
See, e.g., Felsberg & Filho, supra note 49, at 279 (“By recognizing that insolvency is first and foremost an issue to
be resolved by debtor and creditors, the new law has become an efficient instrument to deal with many varied
and complex situations and has been applied in numerous cases in a constructive manner. The number of cases
that have been filed since the new law was enacted bears witness to the positive impact of the new law.” (internal
citations omitted)).
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55.
Indicador Serasa Experian de Falências e Recuperações, SERASA EXPERIAN, available at
http://www.serasaexperian.com.br/release/indicadores/falencias_concordatas.htm (last visited June 19, 2013).
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III. Claim Separation
The treatment of bondholders in a Brazilian insolvency case diverges sharply from
the rights afforded bondholders under U.S. bankruptcy law. In the U.S.,
bondholders are considered individual creditors with separate voting rights and
standing.56 An indenture trustee serves as a type of agent who is appointed to act on
behalf of bondholders collectively, but its discretion to so act is limited by the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA)57 (when applicable), as well as the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.58 These limitations prevent the indenture trustee from taking an active role in
U.S. bankruptcy cases by, for example, voting on behalf of the bondholders for or
against a chapter 11 plan of reorganization.59 Brazilian law, by contrast, treats a
bond issue as a single creditor and therefore does not automatically recognize the
preferences and opinions of individual bondholders.60 Instead, Brazilian law
requires the bond issue to vote — or not vote — as a whole, either entirely for or
entirely against a debt restructuring plan.61 Without the cooperation of the
indenture trustee to vote on their behalf, bondholders in a Brazilian insolvency
proceeding must go through the time-consuming and expensive process of
separating their claims.62 When considering the cost of claim separation, individual
bondholders should first determine how much voting power they can exert over
Class III creditors if they were to successfully separate their claims. Even when some
bondholders successfully separate their claims from the bond issue, bondholders’
overall influence in the case may be marginalized when the indenture trustee and
large numbers of other individual bondholders do not participate. Further, it may
be impossible even to identify large numbers of other bondholders to solicit their
participation.

Filings include requests submitted by potential debtors (requeridas for both bankruptcy and judicial
reorganization) that were accepted by the court and ordered to be processed (decretadas for bankruptcy and
deferidas for judicial reorganization). Small companies are defined as businesses with revenues up to
BRL250,000; medium companies are defined as businesses with revenues between BRL250,000 and BRL50
million; and large companies are defined as business with revenues over BRL50 million. Court-approved debt
restructuring plans as a percentage of judicial reorganizations filings uses an average of the total judicial
reorganization filings for the prior and current years. See id.
56. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
57. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (2006) (“The holder of a claim ... may accept or reject a plan.”); Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3018(a) (explaining who may accept or reject a plan); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (“A creditor or an indenture
trustee may file a proof of claim.”); see infra Part III.A.
59. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
60. See Peter J.M. Declercq, Restructuring European Distressed Debt: Netherlands Suspension of Payment
Proceeding . . . The Netherlands Chapter 11?, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 377, 396, 400–02 (2003) (contrasting the right to
vote on reorganization plans in the Netherlands to indentured trustees’ rights to vote in United States). See
generally Mark M. Polebaum et al., One Creditor or Many? Bondholder Standing in Foreign Insolvencies,
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, May 2005, at 46; see infra Part III.B.
61. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Parts III.B–C.
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A. Automatic Recognition of Individual Bondholders under U.S. Law and the Role of
an Indenture Trustee
The TIA, which supplements the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),63 governs
the distribution of certain debt securities, such as public bonds. The TIA mandates
the appointment of an independent, qualified trustee (known as an “indenture
trustee”) to act for the benefit of all holders of a particular bond issue.64 An
indenture is the contract that governs a bond issue65 and is accompanied by a
registration statement that contains the details necessary for the bonds to be
registered under the Securities Act.66 The indenture defines the relationship between
an identified indenture trustee and the bondholders.67 Specifically, the indenture
will describe the indenture trustee’s responsibilities and potential liabilities, as well
as establish how bondholders can vote to instruct the indenture trustee to act.68 An
indenture trustee’s administrative duties may include distributing interest and
principal payments, monitoring redemptions, providing notice of default to
bondholders, and filing a proof of claim on the bondholders’ behalf should the
issuer enter bankruptcy.69 Beyond such administrative acts, the indenture trustee
traditionally plays a passive monitoring role, even when the company defaults, an
event that generally triggers ordinary fiduciary duties on the part of the indenture
trustee.70

63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm (2006).
64. Id. § 77jjj(a)(1), (a)(4); id. § 77ooo(a)–(d).
65. Id. § 77ccc(7).
66. Id. § 77eee(a); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Debt Securities and Protection of Bondholders—The Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 6 LAW SEC. REG. § 19.1 (2013).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77bbb, ooo.
68. Id. §§ 77bbb, ooo, ppp.
69. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture
Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1044–49 (2008) (describing the typically “ministerial” duties of the indenture
trustee that are set forth in the indenture).
70. Prior to default, indenture trustees generally do not owe fiduciary duties to bondholders except to the
extent that they must avoid conflicts of interest. See id. at 1044–45; 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 470 (2d ed.
2004). Instead, their pre-default obligations are defined by the terms of the indenture. 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a)(1);
see, e.g., Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1416 (3d Cir. 1993); Meckel v. Continental Resources Co., 758 F.2d
811, 816 (2d Cir. 1985); BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of America, N.A., 778 F. Supp. 2d 375, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The question is whether [the indenture trustee] performed its express duties under the
contract, and [the indenture trustee] is strictly liable for any breach of these duties as a matter of basic contract
law.”). But see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 11 N.Y.3d 146, 156–57 (N.Y.
2008) (noting that some courts have found indenture trustees to owe a pre-default “extracontractual duty to
perform basic, nondiscretionary, ministerial functions redressable in tort if such a duty is breached”). Postdefault, however, the TIA introduces a heightened standard of care, requiring the indenture trustee to exercise
“the same degree of care and skill . . . as a prudent man would exercise or use under the circumstances in the
conduct of his own affairs.” 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c). In addition, U.S. courts have generally held that an event of
default triggers ordinary fiduciary duties on the part of the indenture trustee. See Gresser v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. CCB-12-987, 2012 WL 5250553, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 2012) (“[A] broad, fiduciary-like duty to
protect noteholder interests seems to be what the TIA intended to vest in indenture trustees during defaults.”);
Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 632 N.Y.S.2d 520, 527–28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (“[S]ubsequent to
the obligor’s default . . . it is clear that the indenture trustee’s obligations come more closely to resemble those of
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Due to uncertainty surrounding their role and duties in a chapter 11 case,71
indenture trustees often act in a manner that prioritizes minimizing liability for
themselves over advocating the best interests of the bondholders.72 For example,
they may refuse to act without approval by a majority of bondholders, so as to fit
within the TIA’s safe harbor for actions taken “in good faith in accordance with the
direction of [a majority of] the holders . . . .”73
Furthermore, the indenture trustee’s role in a chapter 11 case is limited by both
the TIA and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The TIA prevents “all binding bondholder
votes that would modify any core term — principal amount, interest rate, and
maturity date — of a bond indenture.”74 This provision thus prohibits the indenture
trustee from voting on any proposed plan of reorganization that would alter the
principal, interest, and maturity of a non-consenting bondholder. The U.S.
Bankruptcy Code also prevents the indenture trustee from voting on a plan of
reorganization. Because the Bankruptcy Code limits those entitled to vote on a plan
of reorganization to “holder[s] of a[n allowed] claim or interest”75 and defines
“claim” as a “right to payment,”76 courts have held that “it is the beneficial holder
an ordinary fiduciary, regardless of any limitations or exculpatory provisions contained in the indenture.”).
However, due to ambiguity in the TIA and case law surrounding the extent of such post-default duties,
indenture trustees are often uncertain of their role in a bankruptcy case, leading them to be wary of taking any
action that could lead to future liability. See, e.g., Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1040 (“Although a
prudent-man standard is widely used and well-developed in other legal contexts, it has received scant attention
in the trust-indenture context. Indenture trustees for defaulted bonds therefore face the conundrum that they
are required to act prudently but lack clear guidance on what prudence means.”).
71. See supra note 70.
72. Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1041–43 (explaining this phenomenon and advocating application
of the business judgment rule in the trust-indenture context as a solution).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d)(3); see also Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1046; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 1126.02[2], at 1126-6 n.15 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012) (“As a practical matter
indenture trustees do not exercise powers not granted to them in their enabling indentures and generally a
trustee will not undertake a trust where such language might be present. The standard indenture gives an
indenture trustee the right only to file a proof of claim, but not to vote, for the bondholders or debenture
holders.”); Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr. & Peter L. Borowitz, The Role of the Indenture Trustee in Reorganization
Cases Under the Bankruptcy Code, 102 BANKING L.J. 436, 440 (1985) (“Beyond [the TIA’s authorization for the
indenture trustee to file proofs of claim], however, the TIA does not mandate that any specific discretionary
powers be exercised by the indenture trustee ‘as a prudent man . . . under the circumstances’ of a reorganization
case.” (footnotes omitted)).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b); Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 232
(1987) (referring to the requirements of the Trust Indenture Act § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (2006)); see
also George W. Shuster, Jr., The Trust Indenture Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 431, 437 (2006) (“Section 316(b) was adopted with a specific purpose in mind—to prevent out-of-court
debt restructurings from being forced upon minority bondholders.”). But see 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a)(2)
(indenture may contain provisions authorizing the indenture trustee to postpone interest payments for a
maximum period of three years with the consent of the holders of at least 75% in principal amount of the
indenture securities).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (2006); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 3018 (“[A]n equity security holder or creditor
whose claim is based on a security of record shall not be entitled to accept or reject a plan unless the equity
security holder or creditor is the holder of record of the security on the date the order approving the disclosure
statement is entered or on another date fixed by the court, for cause, after notice and hearing.”).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).

408

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Jeffrey M. Anapolsky & Jessica F. Woods
[i.e., the individual bondholder], not a holder of record (i.e., the indenture trustee),
who has the ‘claim’ and the ‘right to payment,’” and, thus, the right to vote on a
plan of reorganization.77 Thus, while preventing indenture trustees from voting on
behalf of bondholders, U.S. bankruptcy law automatically recognizes each
bondholder as an individual creditor who is authorized to vote its respective claim
separately.78
B. Lack of Automatic Recognition of Individual Bondholders and the Necessity of
Pursuing Claim Separation under Brazilian Law
In contrast, Brazilian law treats a debtor’s bond issue as a single claim, thus denying
individual bondholders the automatic voting rights they enjoy under the U.S.
system. Instead, Brazilian Bankruptcy Law expects the indenture trustee to express
the voices of all bondholders, by rendering it the only party capable of acting on
their behalf.79 For certain actions, such as filing a proof of claim on behalf of all
bondholders within the fifteen-day deadline in a judicial reorganization, this
expectation is reasonable.80 In other instances, however, the onus on the indenture
trustee conflicts with its conventional role, which, as discussed, is characterized by
an inability to vote on a plan of reorganization in a U.S. chapter 11 case81 or modify
central terms of an indenture (such as principal, interest, and maturity) absent the
consent of affected bondholders,82 and a reluctance to act where discretion is
permitted absent majority approval to shield it from liability under the TIA’s safe
harbor.83 Moreover, the likelihood of gaining consensus among bondholders —

77. In re Pioneer Fin. Corp., 246 B.R. 626, 633 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2000); In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
78. See, e.g., In re Shilo Inn, Diamond Bar, LLC, 285 B.R. 726, 730 (Bankr. D. Or. 2002) (discussing the
relationship between the issuer, indenture trustee, and bondholders and explaining that bondholders “are like
holders of promissory notes evidencing debt of the issuer corporation . . . . [T]he indenture trustee is not the
holder of the claim and, accordingly, is not entitled to accept or reject a plan. The bond holders are entitled to
vote their own claim or interest”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
79. In this regard, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law likens the indenture trustee to its Brazilian counterpart —
the fiduciary agent (agente fiduciário) — established under the Brazilian Corporation Law to represent
bondholders and whose enumerated duties (unlike the indenture trustee) include representation of
bondholders in bankruptcy proceedings. Lei No. 6.404, arts. 66 (appointment), 68 pará. 3(d) (duties), de 15 de
dezembro de 1976, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 15.12.1976 (Braz.).
80. Lei No. 11.101, art 7 pará. 1, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005
(Braz.); see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[9][a][iii], 16.04[7][a][iii] (“The time limit for creditors to file
their claims or submit their opposition to the debts listed by the debtor is 15 days. If the creditor fails to file his
claim during such period, the claim may be subsequently admitted as a late claim. In such case, the creditor will
have no voting rights in the general meeting of the creditors.” (footnote omitted)). In U.S. bankruptcies,
indenture trustees routinely file a proof of claim on behalf of all bondholders pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
3003. FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 3003(c)(5); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 77qqq(a)(2) (2010) (authorizing indenture trustee
to “file such proofs of claim and other papers or documents as may be necessary or advisable in order to have
the claims of such trustee and of the indenture security holders allowed in any judicial proceedings”).
81. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
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who are made up of multiple institutions and perhaps hundreds of individuals, each
with unique priorities, interests, and decisionmaking processes — is remote.
Indeed, it may be impossible, as a practical matter, to communicate with a sufficient
number of bondholders to induce the indenture trustee to act (e.g., a majority),
much less to garner votes from the requisite 100% of those affected in order to
participate in acceptance or rejection of a plan.84 Thus, the convergence of the U.S.
and Brazilian legal frameworks seriously impedes individual bondholders’ ability to
participate in a Brazilian judicial reorganization. In addition, it may create disputes
between U.S. bondholders and their indenture trustee.
If bondholders wishing to participate in a Brazilian judicial reorganization face
an indenture trustee who refuses to act on their behalf, they may attempt to
separate their individual claims from the claim of the bond issue by filing a proof of
claim with the judicial trustee within fifteen days of public notice of the case.85 Once
separated, bondholders gain the rights of a creditor to vote on a debt restructuring
plan at the general meeting of creditors. Although claim separation is not explicitly
laid out in the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, Brazilian courts have authorized
bondholders to obtain individual recognition under the court’s general power to
admit or alter claims.86 To actually separate their claim so as to gain voting rights,
however, bondholders must go through a time-consuming, expensive, and
convoluted process of filing cumbersome and labor-intensive forms to prove their
ownership.87 For institutions that manage many separate funds and accounts, each
fund and account must fill out separate forms that explain and prove its identity,
legal status, and authorization in extensive detail.88 Fund managers may require
burdensome cooperation from their clients to gather this information, including a
power of attorney, by-laws, certificate of incorporation, certificate of incumbency,
and management agreement. Each form must be properly consularized,89 notarized,
sworn, and translated into Portuguese.90 Any mistake or omission may disqualify

84. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1547–49 (2001)
(describing the complexity of the indirect holding system used in U.S. and global securities markets).
85. Lei No. 11.101, art. 7, pará. 1.
86. Id. art. 39; see, e.g., Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A., No.
0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301 (13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29, 2012) (approving the claim separation of Barclays
Bank PLC, Nomura Securities International, Inc., J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. and other individual
bondholders).
87. Lei No. 11.101, art. 7, pará. 1, art. 9.
88. See generally id.
89. A document is deemed consularized when executed before and notarized by a foreign notary. José
Henrique Lamensdorf, Almost Everything You Wanted to Know About Certified (Sworn) Translations in Brazil,
http://www.lamensdorf.com/br/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
90. See Paulo Fernando Campana Filho, The Legal Framework for Cross-Border Insolvency in Brazil, 32
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 97, 140–41 (2009) (explaining that foreign creditors in Brazilian bankruptcy cases face
bureaucratic obstacles to efficiently solving cross-border cases due to the 1973 Brazilian Code of Civil
Procedure’s requirement that all foreign documents be officially translated into Portuguese for recognition in
court).
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the application, causing the bondholder further delay, at which time critical
deadlines may have passed.91
Proving ownership of bonds in a modern world of online transactions can be
especially challenging. Debt capital markets transactions regularly rely on electronic
information provided by the Depository Trust Company (DTC), but such digital
evidence is inadequate for Brazilian courts considering claim separation.92 The
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law requires “financial instruments and documents that
legitimize the claims [to] be submitted in the original or by certified copies if
attached to other proceedings.”93 The DTC annually settles over US$1 quadrillion in
securities transactions throughout 120 countries in which investors rely on the
integrity of its data.94 Nevertheless, Brazilian law does not acknowledge such
realities; instead requiring documentation to which bondholders may not have
prompt access. This antiquated level of detail may embolden a debtor to file
frivolous objections regarding a bondholder’s claim separation application in order
to create strategic delays in the expedited insolvency process.95
Moreover, even if bondholders are able to separate their claims successfully in
order to gain voting rights in a Brazilian insolvency proceeding, their voting power
may be inconsequential to the overall vote of Class III creditors. Since the indenture
trustee will likely abstain from voting for non-separated bondholders, only the
separated bondholders’ voices will be heard.96 Without aligning with other similarly
situated creditors, bondholders with separated claims will likely face an uphill battle
to negotiate a favorable outcome for bondholders overall. Accordingly, the debtor
may cater to other creditor groups with more influence on the outcome of the
proceeding, such as labor or tax creditors.97
C. Claim Separation in Practice
In practice, claim separation can become a time-consuming, costly distraction for
international bondholders who could otherwise focus on the debtor’s operational
performance, prospects for selling the company’s assets to one or more acquirers,
91. See Lei No. 11.101, art. 7 pará. 1, art. 19.
92. Article 9 of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law enumerates the documentation that a creditor must submit
in a proof of claim, which includes documents evidencing the claims. Id. art. 9(III).
93. Id. art. 9, pará. único.
94. About DTCC: Our Business, DTCC (2012), http://www.dtcc.com/about/business/. The DTC is a
subsidiary of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. See About DTCC: Subsidiaries & Joint Ventures, The
Depository Trust Company (DTC), DTCC (2012), http://www.dtcc.com/about/subs/dtc.php.
95. The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law permits the debtor or any creditor to file an opposition to any claim,
alleging lack of a claim or challenging its lawfulness, amount, or rating. Lei No. 11.101, arts. 8, 13. The
bondholder must then file an answer, attaching any additional evidence considered necessary. Id. art. 11. An
opposition creates a separate case record, which must be decided by the judge who may order an evidentiary
and judgment hearing if necessary. Id. arts. 13, 15.
96. Id. art. 45 (only the votes of creditors who are represented at the general meeting count towards
obtaining the requisite percentage of assenting creditors for plan approval).
97. See Paiva, supra note 21.
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and establishing alliances with bank lenders and other creditors. A recent example
of these challenges is the 2012 Brazilian insolvency case involving Centrais Elétricas
do Pará S.A. (CELPA). In June 2011, CELPA issued US$250 million of 10.5% notes
due 2016 to qualified institutional buyers in accordance with Rule 144A of the U.S.
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and outside the United States in accordance
with Regulation S of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended.98 After paying one
coupon in December 2011, on February 28, 2012, CELPA suddenly filed for judicial
reorganization before the Thirteenth Civil Court of Belém in Pará, Brazil.99 At the
time of CELPA’s filing, eight institutional investors, all of whom wished to
participate in the reorganization proceedings, held approximately 45% of the
bonds.100 Repeated efforts to identify the other 55% of the bondholders via the DTC,
underwriters, listing exchange, trading exchange, clearinghouses, and
advertisements were unsuccessful. With only 45% of holders providing direction,
the indenture trustee refused to take action for fear of being held liable to
undiscovered holders who could later sue the indenture trustee for taking action
without first obtaining majority or unanimous approval, as the case may be.101
Without the indenture trustee’s support, CELPA’s bondholders were
immediately confronted with the issue of claim separation following the
commencement of the judicial reorganization. In order to be heard on issues before
the court and to get the debtor’s attention in negotiations, the bondholders needed
to establish individual standing in the case via claim separation. The eight
institutional bondholders represented approximately 39 individual funds and
accounts with respect to CELPA bonds.102 After weeks of preparing claim separation

98. Latin America: Brazil, TROUBLED CO. REP., Mar. 19, 2012, available at http://bankrupt.com/
TCRLA_Public/120319.mbx.
99. Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A., No. 0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301
(13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29, 2012).
100. Id.
101. See discussion regarding role of U.S. indenture trustee in insolvency proceedings supra Part III.A.
102. Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A., No. 0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301
(13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29, 2012) (approving the separation of claims of Thornburg Investment Income
Builder Fund; Thornburg Strategic Income Fund; TRP SICAV Global Emerging Markets Corporate Bond Fund;
Sumitomo Trust Emerging Markets Bond Mother Fund; TRP Global Emerging Markets Bond Fund (DSBI
Global Investment Trust); Nordea 1 Emerging Market Corporate Bond Fund; John Hancock Funds II Spectrum Income Fund; T. Rowe Price Fixed Income Trust; T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Bond Fund; T.
Rowe Price Institutional Emerging Markets Bond Fund; T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Bond Trust; T. Rowe
Price Strategic Income Fund, Inc.; Franklin Templeton Emerging Market Debt Opportunities Fund PLC; FTIF Templeton Global High Yield Fund; Franklin Global Trust - Franklin Templeton Emerging Market Debt
Opportunities Fund; Franklin Templeton Emerging Market Debt Opportunities (Master) Fund Ltd.; FT
Opportunistic Distressed Fund, Ltd.; Pennsylvania Public Employee’s Retirement System; The JBUT Master
Investment Partnership, LLP; The Harry L. Bradley Jr. Trusts Master Investment Partnership LLP; John
Hancock Investors Trust; John Hancock Strategic Income Fund; John Hancock Fund II Strategic Income Fund;
John Hancock Trust Strategic Income Trust; Kentucky Retirement Systems Pension; Manulife Am Strategic
Income Pooled Fund; Manulife Emerging Markets Debt Fund; Manulife Global Emerging Market High Yield
Fund; Manulife Strategic Income Fund (159); Public Employees Retirement of New Mexico; Moneda Deuda
Latinoamericana Fondo De Inversión; Moneda Retorno Absoluto Fondo De Inversion; Moneda Absolute
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forms for each fund and account, their counsel submitted the applications to the
court.103 Seeing an opportunity to gain an advantage in negotiations, CELPA’s
counsel objected to the claim separation in order to silence the voices of
bondholders.104 Nearly 20 weeks after the commencement of CELPA’s judicial
reorganization, the court ruled in favor of bondholders, approving the claim
separation.105 CELPA’s counsel then appealed this ruling to create further delay and
to gain additional negotiating leverage.106 Weeks later, the appellate court affirmed
the claim separation. CELPA’s counsel again appealed to maintain its perceived
advantage.107 While ultimately the bondholders were able to vote on CELPA’s debt
restructuring plan, the debtor’s delay tactics distracted the bondholders throughout
nearly the entire 180-day time period for the judicial reorganization.
D. Potential Solutions
These issues could be ameliorated by amending the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law such
that bondholders’ claims are recognized as independent from that of the bond issue.
It is difficult to imagine who would be prejudiced by such a change, and, with little
to no cost to other parties to the judicial reorganization, the benefit to bondholders
would be significant. Bondholders could focus their efforts on negotiating a fair and
equitable plan rather than on separating their claims. In addition, it would be
constructive to amend the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law to loosen the technical
requirements of proving claim ownership by recognizing the DTC’s record as
sufficient for that purpose.
Alternatively, these issues could be resolved by amending the TIA for future U.S.
bond issuances involving foreign issuers from countries like Brazil.108 First, the TIA

Return Fund; Moneda Latin America Corporate Debt Fund; and Fondo Larraín Vial Renta Fija
Lationoamericana FI).
103. Id. (approving the motion for claim separation of Barclays Bank PLC, Nomura Securities International,
Inc., J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. and other individual bondholders).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Interlocutory Appeal Nomura Securities International, Inc., State Court of Appeals of Pará State
(case no. 2012.3016.5917); Interlocutory Appeal J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd., State Court of Appeals of Pará
State (case no. 2012.3016.5909); Interlocutory Appeal Bondholders, State Court of Appeals of Pará State (case
no. 2012.3016.5925); Interlocutory Appeal Barclays Bank PLC, State Court of Appeals of Pará State (case no.
2012.3016.5933).
107. Supra note 106.
108. Academics have criticized the TIA for inhibiting the indenture trustee’s ability to effectively advocate
the best interests of bondholders. See, e.g., Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1042 (“These deficiencies in the
post-default governance of public bond issues by indenture trustees contrast unfavorably with the increasingly
sophisticated post-default behavior of lenders on private debt. Although it is possible that these private-lender
actions may benefit public bondholders, the interests of private lenders are by no means perfectly aligned with
the interests of bondholders. Frequently, private lenders and public bondholders are competing creditors, such
as when the bonds are subordinate to the company’s other debt. Bondholders then may need an effective
indenture trustee to protect their rights, especially since aggressive bargaining by private lenders can
systematically advantage them over the public bondholders.”) (footnotes omitted); accord Marcel Kahan, The
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could authorize an indenture to provide for a lower threshold than the affirmative
vote of 100% of those affected by a proposal, such as a simple majority, for directing
the indenture trustee to modify central terms of an indenture such as principal,
interest, and maturity in an insolvency proceeding. A lower threshold would
acknowledge the practical reality that it is rarely possible to locate every single
bondholder, especially in the 180-day timeframe of a Brazilian judicial
reorganization.
Second, when calculating whether the threshold has been reached for taking
action in insolvency proceedings, the TIA could authorize indentures to provide
that only bondholders who indicate direction should be counted, assuming
adequate notice to all bondholders was given beforehand. For example, in the
CELPA case where only 45% of bondholders were ever located, a unanimous
direction by these bondholders would satisfy a 100% threshold if the unknown
bondholders were excluded. This approach also acknowledges the practical reality
that it is rarely possible to locate every single bondholder and, accordingly, uses a
unanimous vote of the known bondholders as a proxy for the remaining
bondholders.
Third, the TIA could authorize the indenture trustee to act in the best interests
109
of bondholders in the absence of direction by 100% of bondholders. The TIA
already includes a prudent man standard for governing the actions of an indenture
trustee.110 The indenture could refer to this standard when authorizing the
indenture trustee to negotiate with a debtor and other creditors, object to motions
of the debtor, and cast a vote approving or denying a debt restructuring plan in a
Brazilian judicial reorganization. Empowering the indenture trustee with this
authority would motivate the indenture trustee to act in order to avoid potential
liability from inaction.

Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 569 (1995). These structural
disadvantages between public bondholders and private lenders in U.S. cases are exacerbated when foreign
bondholders face local banks in an insolvency proceeding outside of the U.S. Local banks are likely to have
closer ties with the local management, owners, and directors of local debtors than foreign bondholders.
Moreover, local banks are more likely to do business with local debtors after the insolvency proceeding is
resolved; whereas foreign bondholders are more likely to try to sell their investments as soon as the insolvency
proceeding concludes. Furthermore, the advisors of local banks are more likely to have preexisting relationships
with the local debtor’s advisors although foreign bondholders can try to hire well-connected local advisors as
well. Finally, local banks are more likely to have local government connections than foreign bondholders.
109. See, e.g., Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1041–43 (advocating application of the business judgment
rule in the trust-indenture context to protect indenture trustees from liability when acting on behalf of
bondholders in a bankruptcy case).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (2006).
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IV. Organizing Creditors in an
Insolvency Proceeding
There are many reasons why similarly situated creditors should organize when
confronted with the insolvency of a common borrower. Most importantly, united
creditors can negotiate the best overall outcome by focusing on maximizing the
value of the debtor’s assets. As a result of joining forces, creditors can resist a
debtor’s efforts to divide and conquer by pitting some creditors against others.
Organized creditors can share costs for professional advisors to assist in negotiation,
litigation, appraisals, and, if necessary, liquidation. They can also work together to
disseminate information and minimize fraud, misrepresentation, and self-dealing
by the debtor. Finally, organized creditors can speak with one voice to the debtor in
order to streamline negotiations and create a more efficient process.
A. Creditors’ Committees Under U.S. Law
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires the U.S. trustee to appoint an official
committee of unsecured creditors to represent the interests of all general unsecured
111
creditors, including bondholders. The trustee may use its discretion to appoint
additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders,112 though multiple
committees are not typical.113 The U.S. trustee selects which creditors will serve as
members of the committee of general unsecured creditors (as well as other
committees, if any) at a meeting of all creditors held soon after the filing of the
bankruptcy case.114 In general, the trustee will appoint the creditors holding the
seven largest claims against the debtor to serve on the committee.115 However, the
committee should include membership from many categories of unsecured claims
(e.g., senior bondholders, subordinated bondholders, trade creditors,
union/employee creditors, and unsecured bank lenders) in order to be
representative of all interests.116 Service on a committee is entirely voluntary.117
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code authorizes the committee to perform certain tasks in
connection with the bankruptcy case.118 These tasks include: consulting with the

111. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2006).
112. Id. § 1102(a)(1)–(2).
113. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1102.02[4][a] (“The United States trustee should
appoint additional committees only if necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors. In the vast
majority of chapter 11 cases, a single committee of creditors should be sufficient and multiple committees will
be the exception rather than the rule.”) (footnote omitted).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a)–(b)(1); FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 2003.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1). In the case of a committee of equity holders, the committee will generally
consist of the equityholders holding the seven largest amounts of equity securities of the debtor. Id. §
1102(b)(2).
116. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1102.02[b][i].
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1)–(2).
118. Id. § 1103; see also H. PETER NESVOLD ET AL., THE ART OF DISTRESSED M&A: BUYING, SELLING, AND
FINANCING TROUBLED AND INSOLVENT COMPANIES 37 (2011).
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debtor concerning case administration; investigating the conduct and financial
condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business, and the desirability
of the continuance of the business; participating in the formulation of a plan, as
well as collecting and filing with the court acceptances or rejections of a plan;
requesting the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee or examiner; and performing
such other services as are in the interest of those represented.119 In addition, the
Bankruptcy Code explicitly gives the committee standing to be heard by the
bankruptcy court on any issue.120
To aid in its performance of these tasks, the committee, with the bankruptcy
court’s approval, may employ attorneys, accountants, and other professional
advisors, such as investment bankers, appraisers, and turnaround consultants.121
These advisors’ reasonable fees and expenses are not paid by the committee or the
creditors that they represent; rather, such costs are paid directly by the debtor
following court approval.122
B. Creditors’ Committees Under Brazilian Law
Although the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law also provides for the formation of a
creditors’ committee during a judicial reorganization,123 this committee is very
different from an official committee of unsecured creditors formed pursuant to the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The establishment of a creditors’ committee in Brazil is not
mandatory and is relatively rare. A committee may be established upon the
resolution of any class of creditors at a general meeting of all creditors, which takes
place during the initial stages of a judicial reorganization.124 At the general meeting,
the creditors are rigidly divided into three classes, regardless of the amount of their
claims or the number or diversity of creditors in each class: (1) labor creditors
(Class I), (2) secured creditors (Class II), and (3) and a catch-all class generally
populated by unsecured creditors (Class III).125 Each class votes for a creditor (as
well as two alternates) to serve as its representative on the committee.126 A creditors’
committee thus consists of one elected representative from each class of creditors
and represents the interests of all creditors, not just those of unsecured creditors.127
Brazilian law does not provide a formal way for bondholders and other unsecured

119. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c).
120. Id. § 1109(b).
121. Id. § 1103(a); see also NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 173.
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a).
123. Lei No. 11.101, art. 26, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005
(Braz.).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (composition of committee of creditors consists of one representative from each class and is formed
by resolution at the general meeting); see also id. art. 44 (specifying that only members of class may vote for its
representative).
127. Id. art. 26.
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creditors to organize separately, creating a significant disadvantage for international
bondholders. When a committee is not formed at the general meeting, the judicial
trustee (or the judge in the event that the judicial trustee has a conflict of interest) is
responsible for fulfilling the duties that would otherwise be assigned to the
committee.128
When formed, creditors’ committees face certain duties under Brazilian law.129
These duties include, inter alia: supervising the activities of the debtor in judicial
reorganization or the judicial trustee in bankruptcy; in the case of a judicial
reorganization, submitting a report on the debtor’s activities every thirty days;
monitoring the case proceedings and ensuring legal compliance; informing the
judge upon the discovery of any violation of the rights or injury to the interests of
creditors; verifying and issuing an opinion on any complaints by interested parties;
requesting that the judge call general meetings of creditors; and supervising the
130
performance of a debt restructuring plan. Importantly, however, fees and
expenses incurred by the committee in its performance of these duties (e.g., the cost
of employing legal counsel and other professional advisors) are not automatically
paid for by the bankruptcy estate.131 Instead, the committee must request
reimbursement from the judge, which “shall be [made] in accordance with available
cash funds.”132 In addition, committee members may be held liable for any losses to
the bankruptcy estate, the debtor, or the creditors caused by the committee’s malice
or negligence.133
These aspects of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law have negatively impacted the
importance and competence of creditors’ committees in insolvency cases. While the
creditors’ committee in a U.S. bankruptcy case constitutes a critical platform for
unsecured creditors to advance their interests, the creditors’ committee under the
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law is rarely established and — when established — replete
with conflicts of interest that diminish its value.
1. Creditors’ Committees Rarely Established
Due to the expenses and potential liability associated with serving on a Brazilian
creditors’ committee,134 few creditors are willing to do so. As a result, a creditors’
committee is rarely established.135 Luiz Fernando Valente de Paiva, a Brazilian
128. Id. art. 28.
129. Id. art. 27.
130. Id.; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.03[4][c]. Noticeably absent from this list are any tasks related
to helping to formulate the plan of reorganization that will ultimately be presented to the creditors for a vote.
131. Lei No. 11.101, art. 29.
132. Id.
133. Id. art. 32. Any members who disagree with a committee resolution must state their dissent in the
committee minutes to avoid liability. Id.
134. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Alexandre Couto Silva, Complying with the Changing Environment of Brazilian Bankruptcy
Law, in BANKRUPTCY LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES IN SOUTH AMERICA: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE
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bankruptcy practitioner, professor, and member of the final drafting committee for
the 2005 law, has called for amendments to the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law that
would include compensation for professional advisors to the committee and the
members’ release of liability for negligence, noting that “[w]ithout these changes,
the creditors’ committee will continue to be an entity existing only on paper and in
the imagination of the lawmaker.”136 Paiva’s view is in line with the
recommendations of the World Bank, set forth in its Principles and Guidelines for
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, which explains the important role
fulfilled by a creditors’ committee as “provid[ing] ‘double protection’ for creditors,
giving them the ability to participate in and monitor the proceedings” and urges
that insolvency laws provide for the compensation of professional advisors from the
bankruptcy estate to help the committee fulfill this function.137 The failure to
establish a formalized vehicle for creditors to organize creates serious issues
concerning transparency, cohesiveness among creditors, and judicial
administration.138 Furthermore, without a committee, the court and judicial trustee
are burdened with addressing a fragmented body of creditors, as well as carrying
out tasks that would otherwise be assigned to the committee.139
Without a committee to utilize as a vehicle for coordinating efforts, unsecured
creditors must seek information, monitor the case, and challenge questionable
behavior individually. Clearly, many creditors will lack the resources to do so, while
others may not have a sufficient stake in the outcome to make individual action
worthwhile. From a law and economics perspective, individual decision-making can
lead to suboptimal results as compared to collective action. Fernando César Nimer
Moreira da Silva, a Brazilian economist, has used game theory to illustrate that
when a non-homogeneous, unorganized group of creditors make rational decisions
SOUTH AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY PROCESS, WORKING WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL
STRATEGIES 175 (Michaela Falls ed., 2011), available at 2011 WL 586872; see also Paiva, supra note 21, at 31
(“With the enactment of the [2005 law], . . . it was expected that the creditors would be able to participate
actively in overseeing the process by means of a creditors’ committee. This has not come about, given the
creditors’ refusal to assume the post due to the responsibilities that may be imposed on them.”).
136. Paiva, supra note 21, at 31.
137. WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS
paras. 102, 107 (2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ipg_eng.pdf (“Consistent with the
committee’s role in monitoring the proceedings and representing the voice of creditors (at least unsecured
creditors), the committee must have access to impartial advice to ensure that the rights of creditors are being
protected. For this reason, the law should allow creditors to retain an independent professional who will be
compensated from the estate or from the proceeds distributed to the creditors represented by the committee.”).
138. See, e.g., Silva, supra note 135, at 193 (“The creditors’ committee gives transparency, security,
reliability, and efficiency to the process as desired by the creditors. Without the creditors’ committee, the
success or failure of the reorganization seems to be difficult.”).
139. See, e.g., Silva, supra note 135, at 193 (“The failure to timely constitute the creditors’ committee can
create a great imbalance in the roles of the persons involved in the process of bankruptcy and reorganization,
imposing heavy burdens to the courts and to the trustee by overloading them with activities not related to their
crafts, which can be highly complex to them. . . . Furthermore, creditors end up taking their individual and
disorganized actions to the court, disrupting and delaying the process, which generates endless discussions
through request.”).
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on an individual basis, their decisions often do not maximize gains for creditors as a
whole.140 Rather, advancement of the collective interest of creditors depends on their
ability to organize under the rules of the game.141 Silva explains that the lack of
organization exacerbates problems related to inadequate disclosure from the
debtor142 and creates inter-creditor communication barriers, leading to inefficient
outcomes — i.e., the liquidation of potentially viable companies or the
unwarranted reorganization of failed ones.143 He cites the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law,
which he notes does not provide for the efficient organization of creditors,144 as an
example of this phenomenon.145
2. Conflicts of Interest Diminish the Value of Creditors’ Committees
The composition of members serving on a creditors’ committee formed under the
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law — which includes one representative from each of the
three classes of creditors146 — is also problematic. Due to their respective levels of
priority, the interests of each class of creditors are inherently in conflict. With
inherently conflicting interests among members, the committee could rarely, if ever,
act as a cohesive body. Indeed, it is difficult to find a purpose in joining such
representatives into a collective entity. Whereas the primary purpose of a
committee established pursuant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is to maximize
returns for its constituency,147 the purpose of a committee made up of members
where a gain to one generally necessitates a loss to another is unclear. Recognizing
this issue, the World Bank’s Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and
Creditor Rights Systems recommends that “care . . . be taken to avoid potential
conflicts of interests of interests on the committee.”148 The Principles further state:
As a general rule unsecured creditors committees should consist only of
unsecured creditors. In some cases a committee of secured creditors might be
justified. . . . Often, secured creditors have little in common with unsecured
creditors, and their ability to participate in and alter the outcome of
decisions by the committee may be inappropriate and not in the best interest

140. FERNANDO CÉSAR NIMER MOREIRA DA SILVA, INCENTIVOS Á DECISÃO DE RECUPERAÇÃO DA EMPRESA EM
CRISE: ANÁLISE Á LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS pts. III.1, III.3.1 (2009) (faculty of law dissertation, University of
São Paulo), available at http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-18112009-093516/pt-br.php
141. Id.
142. See infra Part VI.C.
143. See SILVA, supra note 140, at pts. III.1, III.3.1.
144. See SILVA, supra note 140, at 63 n.201 and accompanying text.
145. Id.
146. Lei No. 11.101, art. 26, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005
(Braz.).
147. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 16.03[4][c].
148. See WORLD BANK, supra note 137, at 33, para. 105.
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of other creditors. By nature, the interests of secured creditors conflict with
those of unsecured creditors.149
3. Organizing Creditors in Practice
For these reasons, international bondholders involved in the recent Brazilian
judicial reorganizations of CELPA and Independência S.A.150 did not organize
themselves through creditors’ committees. Both cases, however, experienced the
creation of ad hoc committees of bondholders outside of the formal insolvency
process. Each of these ad hoc committees retained legal advisors. The Brazilian
Bankruptcy Law provides that any expenses incurred by creditors in order to
participate in a judicial reorganization cannot be enforced against the debtor, and
there is no exception for ad hoc committees.151 However, an ad hoc committee may
be able to negotiate with a debtor to reimburse its fees and expenses via a nondebtor affiliate, such as another company controlled by the same family that owns
the debtor’s equity. The debtor agreed to such an arrangement in the
Independência case, but the debtor in the CELPA case did not.152When the debtor
does not agree, the members of the ad hoc committee may have to pay for the fees
and expenses of their attorneys, investment bankers, and other advisors themselves.
Rather than trying to organize disparate creditors, it may prove more effective
for international bondholders to buy the claims of local creditors, such as those of
Brazilian banks, to gain greater voting control for themselves. However,
bondholders may be reluctant to invest fresh capital in a distressed situation where

149. Id.; see also id. at 33, para. 104 (“The committee serves as a voice for all unsecured creditors and should
be representative.”).
150. On February 27, 2009, Independência S.A., a Brazilian beef processor based in the state of São Paulo,
filed for judicial reorganization before the Lower Civil Court of Cajamar in São Paulo, Brazil. See BDO
INTERNATIONAL, INDEPENDÊNCIA S.A. (IN JUDICIAL RECOVERY/REORGANIZATION): FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR
THE 9 (NINE) MONTH PERIODS ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 2009 AND 2008 AND LIMITED REVIEW REPORT 4 (2009),
available at http://ir.independencia.com.br/independencia/web/arquivos/3Q09%20Financial%20Statements
%20anort.pdf. Previously, Independência had issued US$300 million of 9.875% Notes due 2015 and US$225
million of 9.875% Notes due 2017. See Press Release, Independência S.A., Independência Commences Consent
Solicitation and Cash Tender Offer For Its 9.875% Notes Due 2015 and 9.875% Notes Due 2017 (Jan. 21, 2009),
available at http://ir.independencia.com.br/independencia/web/arquivos/Notice%20to%20the%20Market%2%20Independ%EAncia%20commences%20consent%20solicitation%20and%20cash%20tender%20offer.pdf.
151. Lei No. 11.101, art. 5(II).
152. Despite failing to gain the debtor’s acquiescence, the ad hoc committee of bondholders in the CELPA
case was ultimately able to convince the acquirer and indenture trustee to reimburse a majority of their
professional fees and expenses during the chapter 15 process that followed the judicial reorganization. See In re
Centrais Elétricas do Para S.A., No. 12-14568 (SCC) at ¶ 14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2012) (order granting
recognition of Brazilian main proceeding and certain related relief and providing for payment of ad hoc
committee’s professional fees and expenses). As a result of the U.S. court’s order, the ad hoc committee received
reimbursement of approximately 85% of their fees and 100% of their expenses. Centrais Eletricas: Brazilian Plan
Approved in U.S., TROUBLED CO. REP. LATIN AM. (Dec. 20, 2012), http://bankrupt.com/TCRLA_Public/
121220.mbx (noting that the ad hoc bondholder group received as much as $1.2 million in professional fees and
expenses).
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they have already experienced losses. They may be faced with an uncomfortable
decision: invest more or lose more.

V. Negotiating, Voting On, and
Confirming a Plan of Reorganization
The dissimilarities in how creditors are organized in the U.S. and Brazil have a
direct impact on how plans are negotiated, voted on, and confirmed. There are
many differences between a plan of reorganization in the U.S. and a debt
restructuring plan in Brazil besides the former being written in English and the
latter in Portuguese. Several aspects of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law – in particular,
non-terminating debtor exclusivity and the negotiation and voting processes –
create serious challenges for creditors navigating the insolvency process and can
lead to poor outcomes for international bondholders.
In both the U.S. and Brazil, certain types of creditors are expressly exempt from
a corporate debtor’s ability to discharge its debts, but the exemptions differ.153 In
Brazil, exempt creditors include “a creditor holding the position of fiduciary owner
of real or personal property, financial lessor, owner or committed seller of real
estate whose respective agreements include an irrevocability or irreversibility clause,
including under real estate developments, or an owner under a sale agreement with
title retention . . . .”154 In addition, since a Brazilian debtor must submit tax liability
clearance certificates before the judge may approve the reorganization plan,155 a
judicial reorganization can only be implemented if the debtor either has no tax
liabilities or has negotiated an installment plan with the government.156
A. Debtor Exclusivity Under U.S. Law
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code grants the debtor the exclusive right to file a plan of
reorganization during the first 120 days of the bankruptcy case.157 The filing of a
plan within that period automatically triggers a “solicitation period,” which
provides another 60 days of exclusivity for the debtor.158 Because the debtor can
easily file a placeholder plan, which need not be confirmable, within the initial 120day timeframe, debtor exclusivity in the U.S. is commonly thought of as lasting 180
days.159

153. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (2006).
154. Lei No. 11.101, art. 49 pará. 3.
155. Id. art. 57.
156. Id. arts. 57, 68.
157. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b). This period of time is known as the “exclusivity period.” NESVOLD ET AL., supra
note 118, at 335–39.
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c).
159. Id. § 1121(c)(3).
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Any party in interest may request an extension or reduction of the debtor’s
exclusivity and solicitation periods.160 The moving party has the burden of
demonstrating cause to support its request, which the court may grant after notice
and a hearing.161 Cause to extend may be demonstrated by explaining the burdens of
organizing the company’s financial affairs, the time-consuming process of assessing
its strategic alternatives, and the difficulties of negotiating with various creditor
constituencies.162 Cause to shorten may be very difficult to prove.163 Multiple
extensions are routinely requested and granted in complex chapter 11 cases, which
describes many corporate bankruptcies, while motions to shorten are rare and often
denied.164
If the debtor has not obtained acceptance of the plan by the expiration of the
combined exclusivity and solicitation periods, the debtor’s exclusivity terminates,
and any party in interest165 may thereafter file a plan of reorganization.166 Permitting
limited exclusivity for the debtor to propose a plan of reorganization reflects a
legislative intent to balance the relative power of the debtor and its creditors.167

160. 11 U.S.C. §1121(d)(1).
161. Id.; see In re Borders Grp., Inc., 460 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he
burden of proving cause to reduce or increase exclusivity is on the moving party”). However, “[s]ection 1121
was designed, and should be faithfully interpreted to limit the delay that makes creditors the hostages of
Chapter 11 debtors.” In re Curry Corp., 148 B.R. 754, 755 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting United Savings
Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 808 F.2d 363, 372 (5th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 484 U.S. 365 (1988)).
162. See, e.g., In re McLean Indus., Inc., 87 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (listing factors used by
courts to determine whether cause exists to extend exclusivity).
163. See, e.g., In re Grand Traverse Dev. Co., 147 B.R. 418, 420–21 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (rejecting
evidence presented to reduce the exclusivity period). As a result, rather than focusing on exclusivity, a secured
creditor who has lost confidence in the debtor’s management will more often seek to lift the automatic stay in
order to seize its collateral, appoint a bankruptcy trustee, or convert the case to a chapter 7 liquidation.
164. In exercising its broad discretion for whether to grant a motion to extend or shorten exclusivity, a
bankruptcy court may consider a variety of factors to assess the totality of circumstances in each case. See In re
Borders Grp., Inc., 460 B.R. at 821–22 (“The determination of cause under section 1121(d) is a fact-specific
inquiry and the court has broad discretion in extending or terminating exclusivity.”); In re Adelphia Commc’ns
Corp., 352 B.R. 578, 587 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (identifying objective factors courts historically have
considered in determining whether cause exists to extend or terminate exclusivity); see also In re Dow Corning
Corp., 208 B.R. 661, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (identifying factors used by courts to determine whether
cause exists to extend exclusivity); In re Express One Int’l, Inc., 194 B.R. 98, 100 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996) (same);
In re McLean Indus., Inc., 87 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
165. A “party in interest” includes: “the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security
holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c).
166. Id.
167. The House Committee Report attached to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code states, with respect to section
1121: “The exclusive right [to propose a plan] gives the debtor undue bargaining leverage, because by delay he
can force a settlement out of otherwise unwilling creditors, and they have little recourse except to move for
conversion of the case to [liquidation]. . . . Proposed chapter 11 recognizes the need for the debtor to remain in
control to some degree, or else debtors will avoid the reorganization provisions in the bill until it would be too
late for them to be an effective remedy. At the same time, the bill recognizes the legitimate interests of creditors,
whose money is in the enterprise as much as the debtor’s, to have a say in the future of the company.” H.R. REP.
NO. 95–595, at 6191 (1978); see also In re Lake in the Woods, 10 B.R. 338, 340–41 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981)
(describing the legislative history behind section 1121 and quoting this House Committee Report at length).
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In 2005, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to limit the permissible length of
extensions to the debtor’s exclusivity and solicitation periods in response to
concerns that bankruptcy proceedings were taking too long and that advisors had
an adverse incentive to prolong negotiations in order to accumulate excessive fees.168
Today, the 120-day exclusivity period cannot be extended beyond 18 months from
the petition date,169 and the 180-day combined exclusivity and solicitation periods
cannot be extended beyond 20 months from the petition date.170 Limiting the
debtor’s exclusivity period works to the benefit of secured creditors, who can
pressure the debtor to expeditiously create a viable strategy to fix the company or
else surrender collateral. Debtors must now address strict time limits for creating a
plan of reorganization and obtaining sufficient favorable votes from creditors for
confirmation.171 Previously, debtors could threaten creditors by endlessly extending
the exclusivity period with the approval of sympathetic judges.172
B. Debtor Exclusivity Under Brazilian Law
While exclusivity is not an explicit part of Brazilian insolvency law, the structure of
judicial reorganization results in exclusivity for the debtor throughout the entire
process.173 When a petition for judicial reorganization is accepted by the court, the
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law establishes a 180-day stay of creditors’ actions against the
debtors’ assets.174 During this period, only the debtor can propose a plan and solicit
support from creditors.175 Absent plan confirmation, this non-extendable stay
terminates automatically, converting the case to bankruptcy (liquidation).176
Within the 180-day stay, the debtor must observe interim deadlines. The debtor
must submit its plan to the court within 60 days of publication of the decision
granting the debtor’s petition for judicial reorganization.177 This 60-day period is

168. See H.R. REP. NO. 109–31(I), at 55 (2005) (“Section 411 amends section 1121(d) . . . to mandate that a
debtor’s exclusive period for filing a plan may not be extended beyond a date that is 18 months after the order
for relief in the chapter 11 case.”).
169. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(A).
170. Id. § 1121(d)(2)(B).
171. See generally id. § 1121.
172. See, e.g., In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., No. 04-45814-JWV, slip op. (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2007)
(granting eighth extension such that the debtor retained exclusivity for approximately 42 months); In re United
Airlines, Bk. No. 02-48191-ERW, slip. op. (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 20, 2005) (granting request for extension such
that the debtor retained exclusivity for approximately 35 months).
173. Lei No. 11.101, art. 5, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005
(Braz.).
174. Id. art. 6, pará. 4.
175. Id. art. 53.
176. See Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[1] (“The debtor will be declared bankrupt during the judicial
restructuring proceedings if any of the following events occur: (1) the creditors’ general meeting does not
approve the restructuring plan; (2) the debtor fails to submit the restructuring plan within the sixty day time
period provided for in article 53 of the bankruptcy law; or (3) the debtor fails to fulfill the terms of the approved
judicial restructuring plan.”).
177. Lei No. 11.101, art. 53.
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non-extendable, and failure to timely submit a plan also results in conversion to
bankruptcy (liquidation).178
Unlike under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s exclusivity under the
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law never terminates so as to give creditors an opportunity to
propose competing plans.179 While creditors may propose amendments to the
debtor’s plan at the general meeting of creditors that is convened for voting, any
modifications to the plan require the express consent of the debtor.180
C. Confirming a Plan Under U.S. Law
The basic objective of every chapter 11 case is to achieve confirmation of a plan of
reorganization.181 Confirmation can be accomplished through consensual
confirmation, which involves obtaining acceptance of the plan from all impaired
classes of creditors or interest holders, or nonconsensual confirmation (popularly
known as “cramdown”), which permits confirmation notwithstanding rejection of
the plan by one or more classes.182
For voting and treatment purposes, a plan of reorganization must separate
claims and interests into various classes.183 Each claim or interest may only be
included in a particular class if it is “substantially similar” to the other claims and
interests of such class.184 In general, classification is determined based on priority
and the nature of the security interest, if any. Thus, the plan will usually create a
separate class for each secured creditor,185 as well as each unsecured creditor granted
priority status under the Bankruptcy Code.186 The plan will typically group all
178. Id. art. 73.
179. Id. art. 53.
180. Id. art. 56; see also discussion infra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.
181. See NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 333.
182. See infra notes 197, 204–05 and accompanying text.
183. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (2006). Certain unsecured claims granted priority under the Code need not be
classified, including claims described in sections 507(a)(2) (administrative expense claims), (a)(3) (involuntary
gap claims), and (a)(8) (unsecured tax and custom duties claims). The Code exempts these claims from the
classification requirement because “a specific majority of claimants with such priorities cannot bind a member
of the class to less favorable treatment than that provided in section 1129(a)(9).” COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 73, ¶ 1122.03[b].
184. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). Subsection 1122(b) makes an exception for relatively small unsecured claims,
which a plan proponent may classify as a single class with court approval for the purpose of administrative
convenience. Id. § 1122(b).
185. Unless, for example, certain claims are secured by the same collateral and have equivalent priority.
186. The Code grants priority to certain categories of unsecured claims set forth in section 507. 11 U.S.C. §
507. In addition the court may grant priority to postpetition loans under section 364. Id. § 364.
Priority claims under subsections 507(a)(1), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), and (10) should be separately
classified because such claims are not substantially similar to either general unsecured claims or secured
claims. In addition, because each of these categories of priority claims differs from the others in priority
rank, the claims in a particular category must be placed in a separate class if impaired under the plan.
For example, if the plan proposes to pay [one category] in deferred cash payments [under
1129(a)(9)(B)] and [another] in full on the effective date of the plan, the section 507(a)(4) and section
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general unsecured creditors (e.g., bondholders), who are entitled to a pro rata share
of the debtor’s assets after payment of secured claims and other priority claims, into
a single class.187 Finally, the plan will generally provide for a class consisting of equity
interests, which may be separated further according to the nature of the interest
(e.g., common versus preferred stock).188
All individual holders of allowed claims and interests may vote on a plan of
reorganization.189 However, voting is tabulated by class, not by the individual
holders of claims or interests. Thus, a class may accept a plan of reorganization,
without having the unanimous consent of its members.190 To achieve acceptance of
a particular class, the plan must receive a sufficient percentage of favorable votes
from the members of such class. For each class of creditors,191 a plan is accepted if it
receives the favorable vote of members holding at least two-thirds in amount and a
majority in number of the allowed claims.192 Creditors cast votes via mail-in ballot
and only class members that actually vote count in determining whether the
requisite majorities in number and amount are met. Importantly, classes receiving
full recoveries under a plan of reorganization are considered “unimpaired” and are

507(a)(7) claims may not be in the same class . . . . However, it is most common for plans to include in
the same class any claims entitled to priority under section 507(a), other than subsection 507(a)(2),
(a)(3), and (a)(8), and to provide that such claims be fully paid in cash on the effective date of the plan.
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1122.03[b].
187. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1122.01. However, numerous other factors may affect the
interests of certain members of a class, warranting their separate classification. For example, section 510(a)
provides that subordination agreements are enforceable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 510(a). Therefore, courts
have permitted the separate classification of senior and subordinated debt, even though the holders of both
claims qualify as general unsecured creditors. See In re Reid Park Properties, LLC, No. 4:11-bk-15267-EWH, slip
op. at 3–4 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2012) (requiring that senior secured debt be classified separately from senior
subordinated debt). Courts have also permitted the separate classification of union claims from other general
unsecured claims, finding the union’s interests to be unique given the demand for a future relationship with the
debtor. See In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Storage Lighting Co., Inc., 149 B.R. 306, 307–09 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1992) (creating a separate classification for labor union claims). While courts may allow the plan proponent to
create additional classes based on reasonable distinctions among claims, attempts to “gerrymander” claims to
create a sympathetic impaired class that will vote in favor of a plan of reorganization will usually generate
vigorous objections and are largely rejected by courts. See NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 359.
188. See Acceptance of the Plan of Reorganization, http://bankruptcy.uslegal.com/chapter-11-bankruptcy/
acceptance-of-the-plan-of-reorganization (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the different classes of claim
holders).
189. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 1126(a). The bankruptcy court may temporarily allow unresolved claims — i.e.,
those that are disputed or unliquidated — for the purposes of voting on a plan of reorganization. Further, the
bankruptcy court may disallow the vote of any holder whose acceptance of rejection of the plan was not in good
faith or whose vote was not procured or solicited in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1126(e).
190. Id. § 1126.
191. As opposed to a class of interest holders other than creditors, such as equity holders, who accept a plan
if it receives the favorable vote of members holding at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests. Id. §
1126(d).
192. Id. § 1126(c).
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conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan.193 Conversely, classes receiving no
recoveries under the plan are deemed to have rejected it.194 The holders of claims or
interests in either situation do not need to go through the mechanics of actually
voting. On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
bankruptcy court may disqualify any acceptance or rejection that was not made or
solicited in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.195
Consensual confirmation occurs when all classes of creditors accept a proposed
plan of reorganization.196 In particular, consensual confirmation requires every
“impaired” class to have affirmatively voted to accept the plan.197 A class is
considered impaired “if the plan alters the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to
which the holders of such claims are otherwise entitled, unless the only alteration is
the reinstatement of the original maturity and curing defaults with respect to an
accelerated debt.”198 Because unimpaired classes are conclusively presumed to have
accepted the plan,199 whether a class is considered impaired determines which classes
must vote to accept the plan in order to satisfy confirmation requirements.200
Important additional requirements of confirmation include the best interests test,
which guarantees that each individual creditor or interest holder will receive at least
as much pursuant to the plan of reorganization as it would if the debtor were to be
liquidated under chapter 7,201 and the feasibility test, which requires a finding that
“[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation, or the need
for further financial reorganization, of the debtor . . . .”202
If the plan proponent cannot obtain acceptance of the plan by each and every
impaired class, then the plan proponent may request nonconsensual confirmation,
or cramdown.203 Cramdown incorporates all of the criteria for consensual
confirmation, except the requirement that all impaired classes affirmatively vote to
accept the plan.204 Instead, cramdown requires affirmative acceptance of the plan by
at least one impaired class, without regard to any acceptance by an insider.205
Further, cramdown involves two additional requirements: (1) that the plan not

193. Id. § 1126(f).
194. Id. § 1126(g).
195. Id. § 1126(e).
196. Id. § 1129(a).
197. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
198. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1124.02; see 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1)–(2) (2006).
199. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
200. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (requiring that each class either accept the plan or be unimpaired).
201. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
202. Id. § 1129(a)(11).
203. See id. § 1129(b) (setting forth the procedure for “cramdown”).
204. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
205. Id. § 1129(a)(10). As a result, impaired classes remain critical to the overall confirmation process
whether the case involves consensual confirmation or cramdown, and negotiations between the plan proponent
and the impaired class(es) and its advisors will usually be the most contentious.

426

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Jeffrey M. Anapolsky & Jessica F. Woods
discriminate unfairly against impaired classes that have rejected the plan, and (2)
that the plan treat such classes fairly and equitably.206
D. Confirming a Plan Under Brazilian Law
Under the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, once the court grants the debtor’s petition for
judicial reorganization, the debtor has sixty days to submit a debt restructuring plan
to the court.207 Failure to meet this deadline will result in conversion of the case to
bankruptcy (meaning, liquidation).208 The plan must contain a detailed description
of the means of reorganization to be used, a statement of its economic feasibility,
and a professionally appraised report on the debtor’s assets.209 The Brazilian
Bankruptcy Law provides a list of the means of reorganization that the debtor may
invoke, which include, inter alia, the granting of special terms and conditions for
the repayment of debt, spin-off, merger or consolidation, share assignment, change
in control, capital increase, succession or lease, payment in kind, and sale of the
company’s assets.210
Once the debtor submits a plan, the judge orders public notice of the plan to
advise creditors of its contents.211 Creditors then have 30 days to object to the plan.212
If no one objects, then the judge must grant the judicial reorganization and the plan
is put into effect.213 If any creditor objects, the judge must call a general meeting of
creditors to discuss the plan, alter it, and approve or reject a final plan.214 The
meeting must be held within 150 days after the debtor’s petition for judicial
reorganization was granted.215 Although the judge sets the timing of the general
meeting and provides notice of the meeting,216 the judge does not preside over this
assembly, which does not take place in the courtroom. Instead, the judicial trustee
manages the meeting.217 The debtor may be invited to make a presentation on its
proposed debt restructuring plan to the creditors in attendance.
At the general meeting, the creditors are divided into the following three classes:
(1) creditors with labor-related claims (Class I), (2) secured creditors (Class II), and

206. Id. § 1129(a)–(b). The Bankruptcy Code's condition that a plan be fair and equitable for the purposes
of cramdown includes requirements known as the “absolute priority rule” that address the priority of payments
to holders of secured claims, unsecured claims, and equity interests. Id. § 1129(b).
207. Lei No. 11.101, art. 53, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005
(Braz.).
208. Id. arts. 53, 73.
209. Id. art. 53.
210. Id. art. 50.
211. Id. art. 53.
212. Id. art. 55.
213. Id. art. 58.
214. Id. arts. 36, 56.
215. Id. art. 56.
216. Id. art. 36.
217. Id. art. 37.
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(3) a catch-all class generally populated by unsecured creditors (Class III).218 At first
call, the general meeting must have in attendance creditors holding over half of the
claims of each class in order to convene.219 Thereafter, there is no quorum
requirement.220 Creditors at the meeting have the option of voting on the plan or
adjourning to continue negotiations.221 Multiple adjournments are common.222 The
plan may only be altered with the express agreement of the debtor,223 and any
alteration must not exclusively decrease the rights of absent creditors.224 The final
plan must be approved by all three classes of creditors.225 With respect to Classes II
and III, the plan must be approved by creditors representing over half of the total
value of the claims present at the meeting, as well as by a simple majority of the
individual creditors present.226 With respect to Class I, the plan must be approved by
a simple majority of the individual holders of labor-related claims present, without
regard to the amount of their claims.227 For purposes of calculating voting
thresholds, all foreign currency claims are converted into Brazilian reais at the
exchange rate prevailing on the day before the general meeting.228 Unlike in the U.S.,
creditors may not vote by mail; rather, they must be present at the general meeting
in order to have their votes counted.229 Creditors may be represented at the general
meeting by proxy or legal representative, provided that they deliver to the judicial

218. Id. art. 41.
219. Id. art. 37, pará. 2.
220. Id.
221. Creditors may choose to adjourn the general meeting in order to avoid voting to reject the debt
restructuring plan because such rejection could cause the judicial reorganization to convert to bankruptcy.
Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[1] (“The debtor will be declared bankrupt during the judicial restructuring
proceedings if . . . the creditors’ general meeting does not approve the restructuring plan.”).
222. Paiva, supra note 21, at 31 (due to the lack of coordination among creditors, “there have been judicial
reorganizations in which over twenty general meetings were held, with countless adjournments, for the
negotiations to be concluded”). For example, in CELPA’s judicial reorganization, the first call for the general
meeting of creditors was on July 9, 2012, the second call was on August 3, 2012, and the third and final call was
on September 1, 2012, which was the 180th day of the proceeding. See Minutes of General Meeting of Creditors
attached to the main case records for the Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A.,
13th Lower Court of Belém, State of Pará, No. 0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301 (13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29,
2012).
223. As noted, the debtor maintains the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization throughout the
judicial reorganization proceeding. See supra Part V.B. Creditors have no right to file their own plan; rather,
they may only propose amendments to the debtor’s plan. Because “no modification may be adopted over an
objection of the debtor . . . judicial restructuring requires the debtor’s cooperation and consent.” Felsberg &
Filho, supra note 49, at 280–81. As a result, if creditors want a plan to be amended, they must voice their
objections at the general meeting and hope that the debtor will be forced to make the modifications in order to
gain a sufficient number of votes for acceptance.
224. Lei No. 11.101, art. 56, pará. 3.
225. Id. art. 45. Note that the approval of a debt restructuring plan does not include a requirement akin to
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s absolute priority rule.
226. Id. art. 45, pará. 1; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[7][b].
227. Lei No. 11.101, art. 45, pará. 2; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[7][b].
228. Lei No. 11.101, art. 38, pará. único.
229. See id. art. 45.
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trustee, within twenty-four hours before the date specified in the notice of
convocation, legal documentation proving the authority of such agent.230
If the creditors do not approve the plan in this manner, the judge may
nevertheless grant judicial reorganization pursuant to this plan if: (1) it was
approved by creditors holding over half of the amount of all claims (independent of
class designation) represented at the meeting; (2) two of the three classes approved
the final plan (or, if there were only two classes with voting creditors, the approval
of one such class); (3) the plan was approved by over one-third of the creditors in
the class that rejected the plan; and (4) the plan does not entail different treatment
among the creditors of the class that rejected it.231 In this sense, the Brazilian
Bankruptcy Law imposes its own version of “cramdown,” though the rules and
voting thresholds differ from those in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and there is no
observance of the absolute priority rule. If the general meeting of creditors rejects
the plan and the criteria for a Brazil-style cramdown are not satisfied, the judge
must declare the debtor bankrupt, thereby converting the reorganization to
liquidation.232
Even when a plan is confirmed and goes into effect, the debtor remains under
court supervision.233 Unlike in the U.S., the insolvency process continues until the
two-year anniversary of the beginning of the case.234 The purpose of this elongated
period is for the court to make sure that the debtor lives up to its obligations under
the plan. During this period, if the debtor defaults on any of its obligations under
the plan, the court will declare the debtor bankrupt, prompting liquidation.235

230. Id. art. 37, pará. 4.
231. Id. arts. 45, 58.
232. Id. art. 56, pará. 4, art. 73.
233. Id. art. 61.
234. Id.; see Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[10] (2011) (“The debtor shall continue under judicial
restructuring until all obligations established in the plan, and also those obligations which become due for up to
two years after the concession of judicial restructuring, have been performed. During this period, the
nonperformance of any obligation established in the plan will entail the conversion of the restructuring into
bankruptcy, in which case the creditors shall have their rights and guarantees reconstituted according to the
terms originally contracted.”)
235. Lei No. 11.101, art. 61. The Independência case is an example of this outcome. After creditors approved
a debt restructuring plan in 2009, the company missed a coupon payment on September 30, 2010 and was
declared bankrupt. See, e.g., Lucia Kassai, JBS Said to Bid 268 Million Reais for Independencia Units, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-23/jbs-said-to-bid-268-millionreais-for-independencia-units.html (reporting Independencia’s September 2010 default on bond payments).
The company ceased operations in October 2010. Independência then sought a standstill agreement with its
bondholders while they tried to negotiate a debt-to-equity conversion. Ultimately, Independência and its
creditors agreed to a sale of assets. See, e.g., Independencia Creditors Agree to JBS Takeover, REUTERS (May 15,
2012, 4:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/15/jbs-independencia-idUSL1E8GFFCU20120515
(reporting sale).
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E. Plan Negotiation and Confirmation in Practice
As a result of Brazil’s fast-track confirmation process, which includes a severe
penalty for failing to reach consensus, debtors should be motivated to propose a
plan that is attractive to creditors in order to receive sufficient affirmative votes to
avoid liquidation. Management should be motivated to save their jobs, and
equityholders should want to retain the ability to earn back their investment.
However, for complex cases involving international bonds, this is not necessarily
the case.
For example, in the CELPA case, while CELPA entered judicial reorganization,
its parent company and affiliates did not.236 Therefore, executives were not worried
about job security because they would continue managing those non-debtor
operations once the case came to a conclusion. Also, because it was clear that
equityholders would receive no financial recovery, the owners’ primary motivation
was to obtain releases from ongoing liabilities related to CELPA. Accordingly, the
equityholders appeared motivated to get the best deal for CELPA’s acquirer, not its
creditors. Since the law prevented the creditors from proposing their own plan,
brinksmanship by the debtor ultimately resulted in the creditors having to choose
237
between a 17.5% recovery under the debtor’s plan or prompt liquidation.
In theory, creditors should be motivated to vote for the best plan that the debtor
puts forward because their recoveries will likely be much worse in liquidation than
reorganization. However, creditors may view their recoveries differently, causing
some creditors to vote in favor of a plan that others find inadequate. For example,
local creditors may benefit from tax writeoffs under Brazilian law if they accept
losses whereas international creditors may not. Under CELPA’s proposal for
unsecured creditors to receive 17.5% recoveries, some Brazilian financial
institutions viewed this proposal as 50.5% recoveries after accounting for a tax
shield of up to 40% of their 82.5% losses.238 It is difficult for creditors to mobilize to
oppose a plan when they view the same proposal differently.
Moreover, there may be non-financial motivations for creditors to vote for a
suboptimal plan, rather than threaten the debtor with liquidation unless the debtor

236. See, e.g., Denyse Godoy, Rede Energia Advances After Closing Sale of Bankrupt Celpa Unit, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Nov. 5, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-05/rede-energia-advances-afterclosing-sale-of-bankrupt-celpa-unit.html (reporting increase in stock price of CELPA’s parent company, Rede
Energia S.A., after concluding the sale of CELPA to Equatorial Energia S.A.).
237. See Declaration of Mauro Chaves de Almeida at ¶ 21, In re Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A. – Em
Recuperação Judicial, No. 12-14568-scc (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2012) (noting transfer of equity interests to
Equatorial); see also Mario Sergio Lima, Rede Energia Units Given Ultimatum by Brazilian Regulator,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 31, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-31/rede-energia-unitsgiven-ultimatum-by-brazilian-regulator.html (reporting that if CELPA creditors failed to approve Equatorial
Energia’s takeover bid, the company would be declared bankrupt and the government would auction CELPA’s
concessions).
238. See Brief for Foreign Representative’s Motion for Order Granting Relief in Aid of Foreign Proceeding,
In re Centrais Elétricas Do Pará S.A.– EM Recuperação Judicial, No. 12-14568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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proposes a plan that provides creditors with more favorable treatment. For
example, vendors may value future business with the debtor and be more wary of
pushing too hard in plan negotiations. Political pressure may cause local financial
institutions to fear government backlash if they threaten liquidation. An acquirer
may promise certain creditors special favors in the future to convince them to
accept a suboptimal plan proposal. Furthermore, if local creditors in Brazil are
more familiar with the concordata process and not the 2005 reform, they may be
resigned to accepting disappointing recoveries. Finally, some creditors may not
have the institutional sophistication or risk tolerance for the brinksmanship
involved with threatening to liquidate the debtor, which requires a substantial
investment of time and professional fees. The process and outcome of liquidation in
Brazil is confusing and risky, making creditors wary of making even empty threats
during plan negotiations. Such lack of clarity is aggravated when the debtor has not
provided sufficient disclosure, such as a detailed list of its assets and recent monthly
239
financial performance. Fear of the unknown gives the debtor a substantial
negotiating advantage when crafting a debt restructuring plan.

VI. Bondholders’ Access to Information
When investing in Brazilian corporate bonds issued in the U.S., international
bondholders likely review a prospectus or offering memorandum that is governed
by the Securities Act. Although this document is intended to contain all of the facts
that each investor needs to make an informed decision to invest in the borrower’s
business, the borrower may nevertheless become insolvent. When this happens,
these investors may be surprised that Brazilian insolvency law does not require the
same sort of disclosure that the borrower was required to provide pursuant to the
Securities Act at the time of issuance.
A. Disclosure Required Under U.S. Law
In the U.S., creditors in a chapter 11 case employ a variety of means to collect
extensive information regarding the debtor’s financial health. The estate-funded
creditors’ committee and its central role in plan negotiations and plan support,
monthly reporting requirements, and rules of discovery have led to a culture of
creditor diligence. In addition, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires that a written
“disclosure statement,” approved by the court after notice and a hearing,
240
accompany any plan of reorganization sent to holders of claims or interests.
Whereas the plan of reorganization explains the treatment and resolution of
creditors’ claims and equity interests, the disclosure statement provides information
about the debtor and the debtor’s estate so that even non-negotiating parties can

239.
240.

See infra Part VI.B.
11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2006); see also NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 343–45.
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make informed votes on the plan.241 The disclosure statement is a highly useful tool
because it typically contains current and detailed information regarding financial
projections for the company’s operations and conclusions about the company’s
valuation, including disclosure of reports done by the company’s advisors,
appraisers, and consultants.242
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires that the disclosure statement contain
“adequate information,” which is defined as: “information of a kind, and in
sufficient detail . . . that would enable . . . a hypothetical investor of the relevant
class to make an informed judgment about the plan.”243 The bankruptcy judge is
given wide discretion in determining whether the disclosure statement contains
adequate information, and such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis.244
However, the Bankruptcy Code does provide some guidelines with respect to this
issue. For example, in determining the adequacy of information, the court must
consider “the complexity of the case, the benefit of additional information to
creditors and other parties in interest, and the cost of providing additional
information.”245 In addition, adequate information includes “a discussion of the
potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the debtor, any successor
to the debtor, and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or
interests in the case.”246 Under the Bankruptcy Code, adequate information does not
require “information about any other possible or proposed plan,”247 and “[t]he
court may approve a disclosure statement without a valuation of the debtor or an
appraisal of the debtor’s assets.”248 Although a valuation of the debtor is thus not

241. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
242. See Jason Cornell, What Information is Required in a Chapter 11 Disclosure Statement?, DELAWARE
BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION (June 11, 2009), http://delawarebankruptcy.foxrothschild.com/2009/06/articles/
bankruptcy-law-basics/what-information-is-required-in-a-chapter-11-disclosure-statement/.
243. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). The Code defines an “investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the
relevant class” as an “investor having (A) a claim or interest of the relevant class; (B) such a relationship with
the debtor as the holders of other claims or interests of such class generally have; and (C) such ability to obtain
such information from sources other than the disclosure required by this section as holders of claims or
interests in such class generally have.” Id. § 1125(a)(2). In other words, the adequacy of disclosure is measured
against the typical creditor within a class. Thus, for example, if one creditor within a class is an insider, but other
members of the class are not, that creditor may not be used as the benchmark against which the adequacy of
information is measured. See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 408–09 (1977) (characterizing an insider as an
“extraordinary” investor who would generally not qualify as an “investor typical of holders of claims or interests
of the relevant class” under section 1125(a)(2)).
244. See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 408–09 (1977) (noting that, in determining the adequacy of information
in disclosure statements, “[c]ourts will take a practical approach as to what is necessary under the circumstances
of each case, such as the cost of preparation of the statements, the need for relative speed in solicitation and
confirmation, and, of course, the need for investor protection . . . [and that] [t]here will be a balancing of
interests in each case”).
245. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. § 1125(b).
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technically required, it is usually included. The Senate Judiciary Report regarding
the disclosure provisions of the Bankruptcy Code explains:
A plan is necessarily predicated on knowledge of the assets and liabilities
being dealt with an [sic] on factually supported expectations as to the future
course of the business sufficient to meet the feasibility standard [to confirm
a plan]. It may thus be necesasry [sic] to provide estimates or judgments for
that purpose. Yet it remains practicable to describe, in such detail as may be
relevant and needed, the basis for the plan and the data on which
supporters of the plan rely.249
In In re A.C. Williams Co.,250 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Ohio created a frequently-cited list of facts to be disclosed in order to provide
adequate information.251 This list included: the events which led to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition; a description of the available assets and their value; the
anticipated future of the company; the source of information stated in the
disclosure statement; a disclaimer; the present condition of the debtor while in
chapter 11; the scheduled claims; the estimated return to creditors under a
hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation; the accounting method utilized to produce
financial information and the name of the accountants responsible for such
information; the future management of the debtor; the chapter 11 plan or a
summary thereof; the estimated administrative expenses, including attorneys’ and
accountants’ fees; the collectability of accounts receivable; financial information,
data, valuations or projections relevant to the creditors’ decision to accept or reject
the chapter 11 plan; information relevant to the risks posed to creditors under the
plan; the actual or projected realizable value from recovery of preferential or
otherwise voidable transfers; litigation likely to arise in a non-bankruptcy context;
252
tax attributes of the debtor; and the relationship of the debtor with affiliates.
Inasmuch as they help interested parties make informed decisions and avoid
fraud, disclosure statements are similar to the Form S-1 filings required by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for public companies issuing new securities
under the Securities Act.253 However, the Bankruptcy Code explicitly preempts
otherwise applicable law with respect to the issue of adequate information.254 Thus,
disclosure statements submitted in connection with a plan of reorganization are
249. S. REP. NO. 95–989, at 120–22 (1978).
250. 25 B.R. 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
251. Id. at 176.
252. Id.
253. Compare In re A.C. Williams Co., 25 B.R. 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (listing several facts to be
considered when determining whether a disclosure statement has satisfied the adequate information
requirement), with Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1) (listing pieces of
information required to be submitted in conjunction with Form S-1 prospectus).
254. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
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exempt from the disclosure requirements of federal and state securities laws.255 The
Bankruptcy Code also protects individuals from liability under otherwise applicable
securities laws who, in good faith, rely on a court-approved disclosure statement in
soliciting or participating in the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of a security under
the plan.256
Until a court-approved disclosure statement and plan summary are distributed
to all eligible parties, the plan proponent may not solicit acceptances or rejections of
the plan.257 Improper solicitation may result in the disqualification of the
improperly obtained votes,258 in addition to an injunction preventing the party from
disseminating materials and/or sanctions against the party.259 Furthermore,
improper solicitation involving an offering of securities could expose the plan
proponent to liability under federal or state securities laws for disclosure,
registration, and other violations.260
B. Disclosure Required Under Brazilian Law
The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law requires limited disclosure in connection with the
filing of a petition for judicial reorganization, as well as upon the debtor’s
submission of a debt restructuring plan. Further disclosure, however, is left to
negotiations between the debtor and its creditors.
First, the debtor’s petition for judicial reorganization must be accompanied by
certain documentation, including:
(1) a statement of the material causes of the debtor’s equity condition
and the reasons for the economic and financial crisis;

255. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 408–09 (1977). This exemption is very important because securities laws
are often implicated in soliciting support for plans of reorganization, which frequently involve an offering of
securities in exchange for claims or interests. S. REP. NO. 95–989, at 120–22 (1978). If plan solicitors were
obligated to comply with the very strict disclosure requirements of federal securities law, such offerings could
become prohibitively expensive. See, e.g., Public Service Co. v. Consol. Utils. & Commc’ns, Inc., 846 F.2d 803,
808 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Without [section 1125(b)], the court . . . would be required in every case to require a full
proxy statement or prospectus. . . . The cost of developing a prospectus or proxy statement for a large company
often runs well over $1 million. That cost would be nearly prohibitive in a bankruptcy reorganization. In
addition, the information normally required under section 14 [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] may
simply be unavailable, because of the condition of the debtor. Finally, court supervision of the contents of the
disclosure statement will protect the public investor from any serious inadequacies in the disclosure
statement.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 227–28 (1977)).
256. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e). Without this safe harbor, such individuals could be liable, for example, under the
antifraud provisions that enforce the securities laws from which subsection (d) excuses compliance. H.R. REP.
NO. 95–595, at 227–29 (1977).
257. Id. § 1125(b).
258. Id. § 1126(e).
259. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1125.05, at 2.
260. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (showing that the safe harbor provided in 1125(e) protects
individuals soliciting acceptances or rejections of a plan from liability under otherwise applicable securities laws
only if such solicitation was performed in good faith and in reliance on a court-approved disclosure statement).
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(2) accounting statements for the last three financial years and those
drawn up especially to support the petition, prepared in strict
compliance with applicable corporation law and consisting necessarily
of: (a) the balance sheet, (b) accrued income statement, (c) income
statement as from the last financial year, (d) management report on cash
flow and projection thereof;
(3) full nominal list of creditors, including those under an affirmative
covenant or covenant to give, stating the address, kind, rating and
updated amount of the claim, and specifying its origin, the system for
the respective maturity dates and the accounting records on each
pending transaction;
(4) full list of employees, stating the respective functions, salaries,
indemnities and other amounts to which they are entitled, with the
corresponding accrual months, and specifying amounts pending
payment;
(5) certificate of regular standing of the debtor at the Company Public
Registry, updated Articles of Incorporation and minutes of appointment
of current officers;
(6) list of private assets of the debtor’s controlling partners and officers;
(7) updated statements of debtor’s bank accounts and of any financial
investments of any kind, including those in investment funds or on
stock exchanges, issued by the respective financial institutions;
(8) certificates of the protest offices in the judicial district of the debtor’s
domicile or headquarters and branches; and
(9) list, signed by the debtor, of all legal actions to which he is a party,
including labor-related suits, with an estimate of the respective amounts
261
claimed.
This documentation is made available to the court, the judicial trustee, and, by
court authorization, any interested party.262
Second, the debtor’s debt restructuring plan must be accompanied by certain
documentation when submitted to the court, including: (1) a detailed description
of the means of reorganization to be used and a summary thereof, (2) a statement
of its economic feasibility, and (3) an economic-financial and appraisal report on
the debtor’s assets, signed by a legally qualified professional or specialized
company.263 Again, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law does not provide for the
distribution of this information to interested parties; rather, the judge is merely

261.
262.
263.

Lei No. 11.101 art. 51, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, D.O.U. de 9.2.2005 (Braz.).
Id. art. 1, pará. 1.
Id. art. 53.

Vol. 8, No. 2 2013

435

Pitfalls in Brazilian Bankruptcy Law
required to publish a notice advising creditors of the receipt of the debt
restructuring plan and the terms for stating objections to it.264
Finally, upon granting the debtor’s petition for judicial reorganization, the judge
will order the debtor to submit monthly statements of accounting throughout the
judicial reorganization term, on pain of the management’s dismissal.265 These
accounting reports provide minimal financial information about prior periods and
without the level of detail and footnotes necessary to understand what progress, if
any, is being made to turnaround troubled operations. Further, they are not
intended to be responsive to creditors’ inquiries and do not include financial
forecasts, liquidation analyses, or valuations. As such, they do not provide the
information that creditors are accustomed to receiving in U.S. bankruptcy cases.
C. Lack of Transparency in Brazilian Disclosure
While the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law requires some disclosure in connection with
the filing of a petition for judicial reorganization and the submission of a debt
restructuring plan,266 the information available to creditors may be substantially
more limited than what would be contained in a disclosure statement distributed
pursuant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or in SEC filings for a securities issuance.
International bondholders may be surprised by the lack of a culture of diligence in
judicial reorganizations. Indeed, creditors may be forced to make important
decisions without feeling fully informed. One Brazilian practitioner and member of
the drafting committee for the current law recently noted: “The lack of
transparency . . . is the most common mistake during proceedings of judicial
reorganization, especially as this prevents the reconstruction of trust among the
parties, and between the debtor and the bankruptcy court, while hindering the
process of negotiation.”267 Reforming Brazilian insolvency law could greatly enhance
fairness in the negotiation process by arming creditors with the information
necessary to make informed decisions, thereby enhancing the integrity and
credibility of the judicial reorganization process.
One way that the Brazilian restructuring process creates transparency problems
is by motivating the debtor to withhold information for as long as possible.
Brinksmanship affords the debtor tactical advantages in negotiations during the
judicial reorganization process. Judicial reorganizations operate under a strict 180day timeline,268 and debtors maintain the exclusive right to file a plan of
264. Id.
265. Id. art. 52.
266. See supra Part V.B.
267. Paiva, supra note 21, at 55.
268. Lei No. 11.101 art. 6, pará. 4; see also Carlos Augusto Behrensdorf Derraik, Bankruptcy Law in Brazil:
An Overview and Practical Considerations, in BANKRUPTCY LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES IN SOUTH AMERICA: LEADING
LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE SOUTH AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY PROCESS, WORKING WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
AND DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES 151, 156 (Michaela Falls ed., 2011), available at 2011 WL 586868
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reorganization throughout.269 Debtors generally maintain exclusive control over the
flow of pertinent information270 and may obfuscate the financial and operational
details of the company to foster disorganization among creditors. The lack of a
committee of unsecured creditors complicates consensus-building among
unsecured creditors over what constitutes adequate disclosure.271 Regardless of the
level of information received by the 180th day of the proceeding, the creditors must
either accept the debtor’s plan or reject it and send the company into bankruptcy.272
As a result, creditors may be manipulated into accepting an indecipherable or
otherwise suboptimal plan at the last moment rather than risk an uncertain
recovery in liquidation.273
A debtor may also resist transparency with its creditors in order to avoid a
declaration of bankruptcy and its attendant dire consequences. Even if
reorganization is impractical and ultimately unachievable, a distressed company’s
management, directors, and owners may pursue judicial reorganization anyway as a
delay tactic. Lack of transparency allows the debtor to prolong the negotiation
process in cases where adequate information would have otherwise prompted
creditors to swiftly demand a judicial declaration of bankruptcy. Debtors in Brazil
nearly always prefer reorganization to bankruptcy, and voluntary petitions for
bankruptcy are extremely rare.274 Fernando César Nimer Moreira da Silva, Professor
of Law at the University of São Paulo, explains some of the incentives associated
with reorganization from the debtor’s perspective:
The debtor prefers reorganization, because the gain from the debt discount
is greater than the amount it would receive in the case of liquidation. [The
debtor] ignores losses to creditors when making this decision. The less
privileged creditors will receive little or nothing, with redistribution of
benefits to the debtor. . . . The managers of inefficient businesses [i.e.,

(noting that “such incredibly short and inflexible time frames make it almost impossible for a court to
reorganize a major business when the court enforces the law as written”).
269. Lei No. 11.101 art. 53; see also FERNANDO CÉSAR NIMER MOREIRA DA SILVA, supra note 140, at 112
(2009) (allowing creditors to produce alternative plans could help reveal information kept secret by the debtor).
270. Lei No. 11.101 art. 64; see also Silva, supra note 269, at 97–98 (noting that the debtor “maintains
absolute control over the business and the information” for the entire 180-day period of reorganization).
271. See supra Part IV.B; see also Paiva, supra note 21, at 30 (noting importance of the participation of
creditors for transparency).
272. Lei No. 11.101 art. 6, pará. 4.
273. See Silva, supra note 269, at 102–03 (“[The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law] does not always facilitate the
disclosure of information. The law is severe in defining creditor classes . . . [and] deadlines for presenting a plan
of reorganization and the legal term of bankruptcy, without leaving discretion for the judge to adjust the
deadlines and conditions to the case at hand and to avoid the practice of opportunistic behaviors.”).
274. Silva, supra note 135, at 189 (“In Brazil, the bankruptcy claim is mostly requested from the creditor
despite the fact that the debtor can request bankruptcy. The debtor in crisis still carries the stigma of failure or
collapse. Often in Brazil, the debtor exhausts its assets until there is no feasible solution.”); see also Felsberg &
Filho, supra note 49, at 286 (“Voluntary bankruptcy filings are very rare in Brazil.”); Silva, supra note 269, at 92
n.257 (noting that voluntary bankruptcies are much more common in the U.S. than in Brazil).
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businesses that should be liquidated] always have incentives to require
reorganization in order to be kept in business during the crisis. They will try
to use the assets to pay current debts and stay as long as possible away from
bankruptcy, squandering assets and reducing the possibility of paying a
higher share of debt.275
Furthermore, a declaration of bankruptcy prompts a civil liability suit against the
directors and officers of the insolvent company,276 as well as a criminal
investigation.277 Until the liability action has been adjudicated, the judge, on his own
initiative or at the request of an interested party, may freeze the directors’ and
officers’ personal assets.278 Although the concept of limited liability would appear to
protect directors and officers in the long run, experts have noted that:
[W]ithin the current business reality, there exists a system of unlimited
liability as a general rule [especially with respect to labor and tax
claims279]. . . . Today in Brazil partners and former partners, managers and
former managers — including those engaged in activity only to guide the
company as board members — have been held liable for the total value of
the company’s labor debts. The situation is so unusual that today even legal
counsels holding powers of attorney to act on behalf of the partners have
repeatedly been held liable for the full amount of labor debts of insolvent
companies.280
With respect to the potential criminal consequences of a bankruptcy declaration,
the judicial trustee in bankruptcy has a duty to investigate and submit a report to
the judge regarding “the causes of the bankruptcy, the debtor’s procedure, before
and after the decision, and other detailed information regarding the conduct of the
debtor and of other persons, if any, liable for acts that may typify a crime related to
the judicial reorganization or the bankruptcy, or any other offense related
thereto.”281 Upon finding evidence of criminal liability, the trustee must transfer

275. Silva, supra note 269, at 92.
276. Lei No. 11.101 art. 82.
277. Id. arts. 22(III)(e), 186.
278. Id. art. 82, pará. 2.
279. Note that, historically, labor and tax claims have often made up the bulk of an insolvent company’s
indebtedness in Brazil. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
280. Bruno Meyerhof Salama, Professor of Law, Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo, Panel Discussion at
Harvard Law School: The End of Limited Liability in Brazil (Jan. 25, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2012/02/related-content/end-of-limited-liability-in-brazil.pdf).
But
see
Felsberg & Filho, supra note 49, at 289 (“As a rule of thumb, officers and directors are not personally liable for
obligations incurred by virtue of administrative acts performed in the normal course of business on behalf of
the corporation, unless they act recklessly, negligently, incompetently, fraudulently, or beyond the scope of their
powers . . . .”).
281. Lei No. 11.101 arts. 22(III)(e), 186.
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such information to the Public Attorney’s Office,282 which then must either file a
criminal suit against the implicated party or open a police investigation.283 Bearing
in mind these potential consequences, one practitioner has noted: “Clients only opt
for bankruptcy when the economic activity performed has ceased to be viable or is
beyond recovery. Even so . . . , we recommend self-declared bankruptcy in
exceptional cases.”284 By so strongly discouraging bankruptcy, the legal regime may
prompt debtors to withhold information in order to pursue fruitless negotiations
with creditors, imposing even greater losses.285
Creditors’ access to information is further hindered by the procedural hurdles
associated with requesting additional disclosure. In order to request additional
disclosure, creditors must petition the court, which is time-consuming and
expensive.286 Even when a debtor is compelled to provide additional disclosure, the
debtor may comply only superficially. If the creditors continue to be dissatisfied,
their only remedy is to repeat the process of petitioning the court, causing further
costs and delay. The strict deadlines in the fast-paced judicial reorganization
process287 exacerbate the detrimental effect of having to seek such relief.
Another way that the Brazilian restructuring process causes transparency
problems for international bondholders relates to Brazilian accounting and
corporate governance norms, which are far less sophisticated and stringent than
their U.S. counterparts. As a result, the information provided tends to be less
reliable and less useful for analyzing a distressed company’s turnaround potential.
In recent years, the Brazilian National Congress has taken substantial steps toward
improving financial and accounting transparency in an effort to make Brazilian
capital markets more competitive.288 Significantly, all companies were required to
conform to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 2010.289
However, such changes will take time, and remnants of former norms — which
have been described as “inimical to the production of high quality accounting
reports”290 — remain common.291
282. Id. art. 22, pará. 4.
283. Id. art. 187.
284. Paiva, supra note 21, at 47.
285. See Silva, supra note 269, at 100–01.
286. See, e.g., Paiva, supra note 21, at 38 (“Although it is a great step forward in relation to the former
preventative bankruptcy, the process of judicial reorganization entails a high cost, may be time consuming, and
still generates a whole series of uncertainties, as the law is relatively new and has been little tested in certain
aspects . . . .”).
287. See supra notes 268, 272 and accompanying text.
288. See generally Lúcia Lima Rodrigues et al., The Origins of Modern Accounting in Brazil: Influences Leading
to the Adoption of IFRS, 24 RES. ACCT. REG. 15 (2012).
289. Id. at 15.
290. Alexsandro Broedel Lopes & Martin Walker, Asset Revaluations, Future Firm Performance and FirmLevel Corporate Governance Arrangements: New Evidence from Brazil, 44 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 53, 54 (2012).
291. See Rodrigues, supra note 288, at 23 (noting resistance to the new accounting methodology and
concluding that: “[C]onsidering the increasing global economic and financial integration of Brazil, the
convergence of national GAAP with IFRS was considered of upmost importance to improve the financial
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The prior accounting model in Brazil developed amid conditions that “reduce[d]
the value relevance of published accounting numbers.”292 Because state-operated
banks accommodated the capital needs of most businesses, accounting and financial
reporting was not designed to induce outside investment.293 The confluence of tax
and financial accounting,294 as well as a lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms,295
also contributed to the diminished quality of such reports. Alexsandro Broedel
Lopes, an accounting professor at the University of São Paulo, describes the
transition to the IFRS accounting model as a “major revolution,” noting:

reporting of Brazilian corporations. . . . However, it is expected that the acceptance of the new paradigm . . . will
take time, its assimilation will require ‘the reconstruction of prior theory and the revaluation of prior fact, an
intrinsically revolutionary process that is seldom complete[d] by a single man and never overnight.’”) (internal
citations omitted). For example, a 2012 study on Brazilian businesses’ cost of capital in relation to their use of
derivatives points out the continuing dearth of disclosure, finding that: “[T]he overriding takeaway is criticism
of the lack of data in the Brazilian market, mainly in terms of the level of disclosure of information in
companies’ balance sheets and explanatory notes . . . . In addition, no systematic procedure to register company
information about dividend policy and credit rating also reduced the sample size.” João Ricardo Ribeiro
Coutinho et al., The Use of Fx Derivatives and the Cost of Capital: Evidence of Brazilian Companies, 13 EMERGING
MARKETS REV. 411, 420 (2012).
292. Alexsandro Broedel Lopes, Teaching IFRS in Brazil: News on the Front, 20 ACCT. EDUC. 339, 341 (2011);
see also, e.g., Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance in Brazil, 11 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 21, 37 (2010)
(“Financial disclosure lags behind world standards. Brazilian accounting standard[s] do not require either a
statement of cash flows or quarterly consolidated financial statements, and only a minority of firms provide
these, generally in connection with a listing on Bovespa Level 1 or higher, or cross-listing on a foreign
exchange.”).
293. Lopes, supra note 292, at 340–41 (explaining Brazil’s “bank-oriented (as opposed to market-oriented)
financial system” and concluding that “[d]espite the fact that some accounting rules in Brazil were influenced
by American standards . . . , the whole of its accounting infrastructure was not based on the production of
information for capital markets.”); see also World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes: Brazil
Accounting and Auditing, ¶¶ 8, 9 (created June 20, 2005, published Sept. 25, 2007), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_bra.pdf [hereinafter World Bank].
294. Under the former accounting model, Brazilian companies often did not distinguish between reporting
for tax purposes versus financial purposes. Lopes, supra note 292, at 342. Alexsandro Broedel Lopes, an
accounting professor at the University of São Paulo, explains: “In Brazil, accounting was basically seen as a tool
to calculate taxes and not as an instrument to reduce information asymmetry between investors and firms. The
whole subject of disclosures including how to prepare footnotes, for instance, despite being demanded by the
Law, were not even taught at universities on accounting courses. . . . Fair value was so distant a concept that
most accountants in Brazil used to say that measuring fair value was a step towards other professions’ domains
(e.g. that of economists).” Id. at 344. The problem with failing to separate the realms of tax and finance when
reporting information about a company, Lopes explains, is that “value relevance is lower when tax rules
significantly influence the financial reporting process, consistent with the assumption that tax rules are
influenced by political and economic determinants rather than the needs of equity investors.” Id. at 342.
295. World Bank, supra note 293, at ¶¶ 50–61; see also Christopher W. Anderson, Financial Contracting
Under Extreme Uncertainty: An Analysis of Brazilian Corporate Debentures, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 45, 54 (1999)
(“[T]he quality of disclosure by Brazilian firms is perceived to be low. South American accounting practices are
dominated by the legal and administrative systems inherited from the Iberian colonizers and the highly political
environment that results from such systems. Brazilian annual reports, for example, are used with little
effectiveness by corporations that usually comply merely with their legal obligations. Indeed, for the vast
majority of firms, financial statements do not correspond to the reality of their operations and the manipulation
of financial statements is not restricted to small firms. . . . [A]ncillary disclosure institutions are weak. For
example, auditors’ reports are of little prominence in the relationship between a corporation and its
shareholders . . . .”) (internal quotation marks, emphasis and citations omitted).
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The new rules require[] a new kind of professional very distinct from the
traditional record keeper. . . . The situation and the challenges in Brazil are
not really about the adoption or not of IFRS per se. The main challenges
arise with the adoption of an accounting model designed to inform external
users and based on judgment, and on the economic substance of
transactions, in contrast to the local model, which was designed to attain
other ends. . . . The future holds many challenges for the construction of a
high quality accounting system in Brazil.296
Moreover, studies indicate that the adoption of IFRS, in and of itself, does not
necessarily lead to higher quality in financial and accounting reporting.297 Rather,
increased corporate transparency is the result of “a country’s investor protection
regime” as a whole, which can be strengthened through “board independence,
enforcement of securities laws, protection of minority shareholder rights,
enforcement of accounting and auditing standards, judicial independence, and
freedom of the press.”298 In this respect, while Brazilian corporate governance norms
are also in a state of rapid change, chronic weaknesses persist.299 For example,
Brazilian law does not require director independence.300 For these reasons,
information that creditors receive from a Brazilian company in judicial
reorganization may be less reliable than what they would receive from a company
reorganizing under chapter 11 in the U.S.

VII. Distressed Asset Sales
One of the sharpest differences between the insolvency processes in Brazil and the
U.S. relates to asset sales. International investors may be surprised by the lack of
protections for bondholders, who have very limited influence over the asset sale
process. When an insolvent company’s assets are sold as part of a judicial
reorganization, bondholders may find themselves at an unfortunate procedural and
informational disadvantage, as occurred in the CELPA and Independência cases.
A. Distressed Asset Sales Under U.S. Law
Section 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code governs the use, sale, or lease of a debtor’s
property in a bankruptcy case outside the ordinary course of the debtor’s

296. Lopes, supra note 292, at 346.
297. Muhammad Nurul Houqe et al., The Effect of IFRS Adoption and Investor Protection on Earnings Quality
Around the World, 47 INT’L J. ACCT. 333 (2012).
298. Id. at 337.
299. Black, supra note 292, at 37.
300. Id. (“Board independence is an area of notable weakness: the boards of most Brazilian private firms are
comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group. Many
firms have zero independent directors.”).
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business.301 When the debtor seeks to sell a business unit, production facility, or the
entire company, the bankruptcy court provides substantial oversight of the sale, the
process is transparent, and creditors have multiple opportunities to object to the
way the debtor proposes to conduct the sale. Section 363 was designed to obtain the
highest and best offer for the assets being sold,302 which is consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code’s general goal of providing fair and equitable recoveries to
creditors. As a result, a sale of a company under section 363 may prove to be a
superior alternative to a standalone plan of reorganization.
Congress structured the 363 sale process to attract potential buyers who might
otherwise shun asset sales involving insolvent entities. A powerful incentive is that
the bankruptcy court has the power to authorize the sale of assets free and clear of
liens or other encumbrances.303 Thus, a buyer may use the bankruptcy court’s order
approving a sale as a valid and practically impenetrable defense to any later
attempts by the debtor’s creditors to assert claims against the assets sold to the
buyer. Except in limited circumstances,304 all liabilities remain with the bankruptcy
estate and the cash received from the sale. Furthermore, while any party in interest
may appeal a bankruptcy court order approving a sale, the Bankruptcy Code
provides that reversal or modification of the order on appeal “does not affect the

301. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006); see id. § 363(c) (stating that, unless the bankruptcy court orders otherwise,
the trustee or debtor in possession may use, sell, or lease property of the bankruptcy estate in the ordinary
course of business without need for a notice or hearing); NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 377–80.
302. NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 377.
303. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (permitting sale debtor’s assets free and clear of any other interests in the
property). In order to sell (or lease) encumbered assets free and clear of all claims and interests, the bankruptcy
trustee or debtor in possession must prove at least one of the following conditions to the bankruptcy court:
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than the
aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money
satisfaction of such interest.
Id.
304. Examples of potential successor liability might be an environmental claim that was not discovered until
after the bankruptcy, or a product liability claim in which the cause of action arose after the date of sale. See
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.06[7] (“It seems clear that creditors whose claims accrued
before or during the bankruptcy case and who had an opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy case are
bound by any plan or distribution in that case. With regard to future claimants, such as product liability
claimants whose claims do not arise until after confirmation of a plan, the claims may not be discharged under
section 1141. If the debtor’s assets have been liquidated, such claimants may seek to recover from a purchaser of
the debtor’s assets. Courts have sought to provide protection to purchasers of assets, who might otherwise be
subject to such claims under principles of successor liability, by approving sales free of all present or future
claims against the debtor or the estate. . . . However, the bankruptcy court’s ability to override principles of
successor liability in bankruptcy sales has been questioned. . . .”).
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validity of a sale,” unless the sale order was stayed pending appeal.305 As a result of
these protections, buyers can bid their highest price without having to discount for
potential liabilities, which may be subjective and difficult to calculate.
A 363 sale typically involves an auction or other competitive bidding process,
unless there are highly unusual circumstances justifying an expedited sale to a sole
bidder.306 The bankruptcy court will focus mainly on the validity and integrity of the
sale process, rather than the ultimate valuation. While soliciting potential bidders,
running the auction, and determining a winning bidder are conducted by the
debtor in possession and its advisors outside of the bankruptcy court, the overall
sale process is governed by the official bidding procedures approved by the
bankruptcy judge.307 When a debtor in possession proposes selling assets, the
bankruptcy judge has the discretion to determine whether a 363 sale is appropriate
and considers objections by creditors.308
A typical 363 sale involves the following steps: (i) the debtor selects an initial
bidder, known as a “stalking horse,”309 (ii) the debtor and stalking horse negotiate
an asset purchase agreement that becomes the benchmark against which other
potential buyers bid during the formal auction process,310 (iii) the debtor files a 363
motion with the bankruptcy court to request approval of the bidding procedures,311
(iv) upon approval, the debtor provides notice of the proposed sale to all parties in
interest, which must include a description of the property to be sold, the time and
place of sale, and the deadlines for filing objections,312 (v) the debtor conducts the
auction,313 (vi) the debtor determines a winning bidder and files a motion with the
305. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). Recently, however, some courts have held that some aspects of a sale order may be
undone on appeal, even absent a stay. See, e.g., In re PW, LLC, 391 B.R. 25, 29–30 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e
reject the contention that once the sale is consummated, the appeal from the order stripping the junior
creditor’s liens is moot and immune from scrutiny . . . .”).
306. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02 (discussing the standard for approval of a sale);
see also NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 377.
307. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02; NESVOLD ET
AL., supra note 118, at 378.
308. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02.
309. The purpose of a stalking horse bid is to allow the debtor to test the market and set a floor on price at
the formal court auction, thereby preventing low-ball offers. In exchange for an early bid, the debtor can offer
the stalking horse several advantages, including break-up fees, expense reimbursement, minimum increments
for overbids, and qualification requirements and strict deadlines for competing bidders. COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02; NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 388–89. In addition, the stalking
horse may have more time and greater access to conduct due diligence on the distressed entity than subsequent
bidders. NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 389.
310. The debtor may make customary representations and warranties in the APA, but they typically do not
survive closing. Id. at 386. Furthermore, typically the bidding procedures approved by the bankruptcy court do
not allow bids to include due diligence, financing, or other contingencies. Id. Therefore, it is critical that all
bidders complete due diligence and raise sufficient capital prior to submitting their bids. Id.
311. NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 381.
312. FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 6004(a) (requiring notice of the proposed use, sale, or lease of property not in the
ordinary course of business); FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 2002 (detailing rules of such notice); see also In re Condere
Corp., 228 B.R. 615, 624–25 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998) (describing the applicability of these rules to §363 sales).
313. NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 381.
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court to approve the sale,314 (vii) the court approves the sale,315 and (viii) the sale
closes.316
In considering whether to approve a 363 sale, courts generally consider four
factors: “whether the proposed 363 sale reflects: (i) a sound business reason, (ii)
accurate and reasonable notice, (iii) adequate price, and (iv) good faith.”317 In
addition, the court will be on alert as to whether the 363 sale process is really a de
facto plan of reorganization because the process runs the risk of rendering certain
rights of creditors meaningless.318 When a debtor requests a 363 sale, it is effectively
asking the court to waive the usual disclosure, consent solicitation, voting, and
confirmation process involved in a traditional plan of reorganization. Further, a 363
sale is protected from extensive judicial review by the business judgment rule,319
whereas a plan of reorganization involves a judicial determination that the plan
meets the statutory confirmation standards.320 As a result, some courts will not
approve a 363 sale that is tantamount to a plan of reorganization.321
Other provisions of section 363 further serve to protect the integrity of the sale
process and promote the goal of obtaining the highest and best bid. Section 363(n)
is meant to prevent collusion among bidders.322 Section 363(k) authorizes a secured
creditor to submit a bid using some or all of its secured claim (a so-called “credit
bid”) to protect against its collateral being sold for too low a price.323 Section 363(e)
allows secured creditors to demand adequate protection if their collateral is the
object of the sale.324
Notably, although all creditors have a right to object to the bidding procedures
involved in a 363 sale, the Bankruptcy Code reserves the right to propose a 363 sale
to the debtor in possession (or the bankruptcy trustee, as the case may be).325 If
creditors want to encourage a sale of the company, they usually must wait until the
314. Id. (noting that the court must approve the winning bid).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 387.
317. Id. at 385–86; see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02.
318. However, section 363 also provides certain protections for creditors who have a claim on the asset(s)
being sold. For example, upon request by a party in interest, the trustee must provide adequate protection of
that interest in the property when seeking to use, sell, or lease the property. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2006).
319. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02; NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 384.
320. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
321. See In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 939–40 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he debtor and the
Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a
reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets”).
322. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(n) (“The trustee may avoid a sale . . . if the sale price was controlled by an
agreement among potential bidders . . . .”).
323. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k).
324. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (“[A]t any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in the property . . .
sold . . . or proposed to be sold . . . by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or
condition such . . . sale . . . as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.”).
325. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in
the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at
¶ 363.02 (discussing the function of 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)).
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debtor loses exclusivity, at which time the creditors can propose their own plan that
involves a sale of the company. Depending upon the debtor’s circumstances, there
may be other ways that creditors are able to influence a sale as opposed to a
standalone plan of reorganization.326
B. Distressed Asset Sales Under Brazilian Law
The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law explicitly recognizes spin-offs, mergers, changes of
control, partial sales of assets, and other similar transactions as appropriate means
of judicial reorganization.327 It also attempts to encourage a meaningful market for
the sale of assets in an insolvency proceeding by providing that the acquirer will not
succeed to any of the debtor’s obligations, including tax and labor-related debts.328
In addition, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law expressly favors the sale of an entire
business, as opposed to the piecemeal sale of the debtor’s assets, so as to preserve
the social and economic value of the unfragmented enterprise.329 The Brazilian sale
process, however, is far less transparent to creditors than the 363 sale procedure
conducted in the United States. International bondholders expecting a process
similar to a 363 sale will likely face unwelcome surprises.
Brazilian debtors under judicial reorganization may accomplish an asset sale in
one of two ways: (1) by including the sale as a means of reorganization in its debt
restructuring plan330 or (2) by requesting judicial authorization of the sale.331 In the

326. For example, in the chapter 11 case of In re AMR Corp., No. 11-15463 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov.
29, 2011), the labor unions and creditors of AMR Corp.’s American Airlines operations helped persuade the
debtor to agree to merge with USAirways Group Inc., despite management’s intent to file a standalone plan of
reorganization. See David Koenig, American, US Airways Announce $11 Billion Merger, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb.
14, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.news-journalonline.com/article/20130214/WIRE/130219891 (“[C]reditors
forced AMR’s management to consider the value of a merger compared with a plan for the independent
American. Eventually they concluded that the best return for stakeholders, and the best chance to compete with
bigger rivals United Airlines and Delta Air Lines, came from a merger.”); Sheryl Jean, Union-driven American
Airlines-US Airways Merger Stands Out in Industry, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Feb. 14, 2003, 10:47 PM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airline-industry/20130214-union-driven-american-airlines-us-airwaysmerger-stands-out-in-industry.ece.
327. Lei No. 11.101, art. 50, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005
(Braz.).
328. Id. arts. 60, 141(II); see also Lei No. 5.172, art. 133, de 25 de Outubro de 1966, CÓDIGO TRIBUTÁRIO
NACIONAL [C.T.N.] de 25.10.1966 (Braz.); Paiva, supra note 21, at 50 (“Legislative history supports the
proposition of the conscientious option of incorporating the concept of free and clear sales into the revised
insolvency legislation as a mechanism to facilitate the maximization of value of a debtor’s assets.”).
329. See, e.g., Silva, supra note 135, at 195 (“The business should be preserved whenever possible due to its
social function that generates economic wealth and creates jobs opportunities and income. This contributes to
growth and social development of the country. In addition, the liquidation of the business causes economic loss
represented by intangible assets such as name, business location, reputation, brands, customers, suppliers
network, expertise, training, prospect of future earnings, among others.”).
330. Lei No. 11.101, art. 60.
331. Id. art. 142; see also id. art. 66 (“Once the petition for judicial reorganization has been distributed, the
debtor cannot dispose of or encumber any items or rights of his permanent assets, unless they are of evident
utility recognized by the judge after hearing the committee, with the exception of those previously listed in the

Vol. 8, No. 2 2013

445

Pitfalls in Brazilian Bankruptcy Law
latter case, the debtor must demonstrate the “evident utility” of the proposed sale.332
In either case, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law provides that the judge should order
the sale to be conducted either through auction by oral bidding, sealed bidding, or
“public proclamation” (a combination of the two).333 The debtor must accept the
highest bid offered.334 Creditors may file an opposition within forty-eight hours of
the auction.335 The sale must be preceded by public notice in a “widely circulated
newspaper” thirty days in advance of the proceeding.336 However, the judge can
authorize a different modality of disposal if so requested by the judicial trustee or
creditors committee337 or if provided for under the plan.338 For example, a judge may
authorize a private sale, which would likely involve a stalking horse bidder.339
In practice, there are many problems with permitting debtors to include a sale
proposal as part of the debt restructuring plan. Because the debtor holds the
exclusive right to file a plan340 and creditors are rarely able to act in an organized
manner,341 debtors hold too much control over the sale process. The debtor enjoys
broad discretion over which potential acquirers can bid and how the winning bid is
determined. Overall, the debtor can avoid including competitive bidding
procedures that would be more likely to bring a higher sale price, even if the
debtor’s motivations are pure. The lack of transparency undermines trust, at best,
and invites corruption, at worst.
Moreover, the lack of transparency in the sale process is exacerbated by
brinksmanship in the voting process.342 The debtor may decide to sell the company
at the outset, but run down the clock in the voting process toward the 180th day to
avoid having to make concessions in negotiations. Since creditors have little input
in the sale process and cannot file a competing plan, there is rarely an opportunity
for creditors to insist upon an auction or other market test of the sale transaction
proposed by the debtor. Presumably, if creditors do not approve of the sale
proposal, then they will vote against the plan. However, rather than risk liquidation,
disgruntled creditors may feel compelled to vote for the plan even if they feel it is
judicial reorganization plan.”); id. art. 140 (“Asset realization shall start independently of formation of the
general list of creditors.”).
332. Id. art. 66; see also Paiva, supra note 21, at 51 (“[The debtor] is generally prohibited from selling or
encumbering any of its permanent assets (except with a prior approval of the courts, any creditors’ committee,
or the trustee), unless the sale is established in the reorganization plan. Generally, the sale will be approved by
the court if and when the need and utility of the proposed sale is properly demonstrated.”).
333. Lei No. 11.101, art. 142.
334. Id. art. 142, pará. 2.
335. Id. art. 143.
336. Id. art. 142, pará. 1; see also id. art. 129 (permitting revocation suit for any sale of assets effectuated
without notice if debtor is ultimately liquidated and its assets are insufficient to settle remaining liabilities).
337. Id. art. 144.
338. Id. art. 145.
339. Paiva, supra note 21, at 52.
340. See supra Part V.B.
341. See supra Part IV.B.
342. See supra Part VI.C.
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unfair. Once a creditor votes to approve the plan, including the sale, that creditor
might be concerned that a subsequent objection to the sale process would appear
inconsistent.
While it is theoretically possible for creditors to attempt to attract alternative
buyers or pursue their own brinksmanship strategy by threatening to vote against
the debtor’s plan unless the debtor chooses a superior bid or elects a more
competitive sale process, there are many practical challenges to such approaches.
Without an organized committee of creditors,343 individual creditors may be wary of
investing their own resources to oppose the debtor’s sale or to attract interest in the
sale from other potential bidders.
Furthermore, once a debtor has chosen its favored buyer, interest among other
potential buyers will likely be chilled. Other potential bidders know that the debtor
has the exclusive right to propose a plan and therefore elect the winning bidder,
without necessarily having input from creditors or the court. The lack of up-to-date
information about the debtor’s finances and operations puts other interested buyers
at a competitive disadvantage. Without access to the company to perform the same
due diligence as the buyer selected by the debtor, other interested buyers would not
have the information necessary to formulate a competing bid. In addition, the
favored buyer may be able to negotiate side deals with local creditors to gain their
approval even if the bid undervalues the company. For example, a buyer may
promise future business. A buyer with ties to labor groups may be able to garner the
labor class’s support as part of a broader deal. A buyer might make political
donations to win the favor of regulators and other political figures. In Brazil’s tightknit business community, international bondholders are at a serious disadvantage.
Likewise, the creditors themselves are at a disadvantage in evaluating the
proposed purchase price or in submitting their own competing bid. In submitting
their own bid, creditors face obstacles in gaining consensus without the aid of a
formal committee, and there is often unwillingness to commit additional capital
after an initial investment has soured. Other obstacles include Brazilian laws
surrounding equity ownership of banks in companies and debt investors’ lack of
management experience.
C. Distressed Asset Sales in Practice in Brazil
The judicial reorganization of Brazilian airline Varig, S.A. and its affiliates Rio-Sul
344
Linhas Aereas S.A. and Nordeste Linhas Aereas S.A. exemplifies a consensual asset
sale process proposed by the debtors and agreed by the creditors. In December
2005, Varig’s creditors approved a split of the company into two segments: (1)
VarigLog, which was purchased by Volo do Brasil, an investment consortium, and

343.
344.

See supra Part IV.B.
In re Varig, S.A., No. 05-14400 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2005).
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reestablished as Varig Logística S.A., and (2) “new” Varig, which became the
reorganized company. When the reorganized company’s performance continued to
decline, Varig’s creditors approved an amendment to the debt restructuring plan to
pursue a sale of the remaining assets via auction.345 The debtor then ran a
competitive bidding process with NV Participações Ltda., a new company
established by former Varig employees, prevailing.346 When the employees could not
finance their bid, the court declared the bid void and authorized the debtor to reauction the assets.347 Varig Logística was the sole bidder at the second auction.348 The
court ultimately declared the sale complete in December 2006, thereby reuniting the
businesses.349 In March 2007, Volo do Brasil sold VarigLog to Gol Transportes
Aéreos, another airline.350
While the Varig case followed a process similar to a 363 sale, CELPA’s case
illustrates the marked differences between the U.S. and Brazil regarding asset sales
in an insolvency proceeding. After initiating judicial reorganization, CELPA
announced that it would transfer its assets to Equatorial Energia S.A. (Equatorial), a
Brazil-based holding company whose subsidiaries are engaged in the generation and
distribution of electricity.351 Subsequently, CELPA’s debt restructuring plan
involved a sale of all of its debt and equity interests to Equatorial, such that all
distributions to creditors would come from cash received from Equatorial.352 As
such, the plan became a three-way negotiation among the debtor, the creditors, and
Equatorial, as the debtor believed it could not concede to any creditor demands
without the approval of Equatorial.
CELPA did not conduct an auction for this sale and did not propose bidding
procedures to the court.353 Dissatisfied creditors faced several hurdles in objecting to
the sale process, including the lack of an official creditors’ committee to mobilize

345. In re Varig, S.A., No. 05-14400 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2005), Notice of Certification of
Publication / Notice of Corrected Filing of Restated Reorganization Plan Approved in the Foreign Proceeding 2,
ECF No. 359.
346. Notice of Certification of Publication 2, ECF No. 359; see also Brazil: Judge Approves Varig Offer (June
13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/13/business/worldbusiness/13fobriefs-006.html?_r=0.
347. Notice of Certification of Publication 2, ECF No. 359; see also Brazilian Court Cancels Sale of Varig
(June 25, 2006), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2006/06/25/2003315589.
348. Brazil’s Varig Sold in Auction to Former Cargo Unit (July 21, 2006), http://en.mercopress.com/2006/07/
21/brazil-s-varig-sold-in-auction-to-former-cargo-unit; see also Brazil: Airline Acquired at Auction (July 21,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/business/21fobriefs-005.html.
349. Otto Eduardo Fonseca Lobo et al., Varig Airlines: Flying the Friendly Skies of Brazil’s New Bankruptcy
Law with Help from Old § 304, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2007, at 42.
350. Press Release, GOL Announces Acquisition of VRG (Mar. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/gol-announces-acquisition-of-vrg-52186942.html; see also Gol to
Resurrect Varig (Mar. 29, 2007), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/03/29/gol-to-resurrect-varig/.
351. See Declaration of Mauro Chaves de Almeida at ¶ 9, In re Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A. – Em
Recuperação Judicial, No. 12-14568-scc (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2012) (noting transfer of equity interests to
Equatorial).
352. Id. at ¶¶ 20–22.
353. Id. at ¶ 93.
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the voices of various creditors, inadequate financial disclosure to determine
whether Equatorial’s bid reflected a reasonable valuation for CELPA’s assets, the
debtor’s exclusive right to propose a plan, and the absence of sufficient judicial
oversight of the asset sale process. The only way for creditors to object to the sale
process was to vote against the plan and demand that it be revised to include a
bidding process open to other potential acquirers.354 However, organizing a
sufficient number of opposing votes among creditors proved to be too much of a
challenge. Ultimately, the creditors voted to approve CELPA’s plan proposing a sale
to Equatorial rather than face liquidation.355
In Independência’s case, bondholders felt that the debtor’s proposed plan
offered such a patently unfair recovery that they decided to commit new capital to
provide the secured exit financing instead of accepting the plan.356 Even though
these bondholders lacked sufficient financial and operational information about
Independência, they believed that the company’s valuation had to be higher than
the debtor proposed. Under Brazilian law, they could not compel the debtor to
reveal additional information so that they could become comfortable with the
discounts contained in the debtor’s proposed plan.357 Rather than face liquidation,
the debtor acquiesced to the bondholders’ proposal.358 Within a year of financing
the acquisition of Independência’s assets, the company’s financial distress
resurfaced and the company defaulted on its new financing from the
bondholders.359 Since a judicial reorganization does not close upon the confirmation
date of a debt restructuring plan and, instead, remains under court supervision
until the second anniversary of the insolvency petition, Independência returned to
judicial reorganization.360 Within the next year, the company ceased operations and
proceeded to liquidate.361 In hindsight, bondholders invested additional capital into

354. See id. at ¶ 8 (noting the presence of a vote).
355. Id.
356. Press Release, Independência S.A., Independência Paritipações S.A Announces Capital Increase of up
to R$450 Million (Nov. 26, 2008), available at http://ir.independencia.com.br/independencia/web/arquivos/
Notice%20to%20market%20-%2011-26-08.pdf.
357. See supra Part VI.C.
358. Press Release, Independência S.A., Independência Announces Submittal of Judicial Recovery Plan (July
14, 2009), available at http://ir.independencia.com.br/independencia/web/arquivos/INDEPENDENCIA_
Comunicado_Plano_20090714_eng.pdf.
359. Press Release, Independência S.A., Important Information for Creditor Livestock Raisers and Suppliers
of Independência and Nova Carne – Debt Repayment Begins in March 2010 (Jan. 15, 2010), available at
http://ir.independencia.com.br/independencia/web/arquivos/CE0110_Notice%20to%20the%20creditors%20%20Debt%20repayment%20begins%20in%20March%202010.pdf.
360. See Lei No. 11.101, art. 61, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005
(Braz.) (providing two year reorganization period).
361. Brazilian Meat Manufacturer JBS Acquires Independência, FOOD BUS. REV. (Feb. 4, 2013),
http://meatandseafood.food-business-review.com/news/brazilian-meat-manufacturer-jbs-acquiresindependencia-group-040113.
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Independência and ultimately received less than they would have under the debtor’s
initial plan.362

VIII. Conclusion
The point of this Article is not that the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law should become
identical to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Rather, the point is to encourage further
reform of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law to address issues having a pronounced
adverse effect on international bondholders. While the 2005 reform made
significant improvements for many creditors, such as Brazilian banks, vendors, and
employees, the reform did not address the distinct issues arising when a debtor has
issued bonds to international investors. Specifically, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law
should recognize the standing and voting rights of individual bondholders.363 This
critical first step would at least provide international bondholders with a seat at the
negotiating table when their investment in Brazilian corporate bonds becomes
distressed, without having to go through the time-consuming and expensive
distraction of claim separation. The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law should also provide
an adequate mechanism for unsecured creditors to organize separately from other
creditors and receive reimbursement for the reasonable fees and expenses of their
advisors.364 In addition, the law can restore the balance of power in plan
negotiations by authorizing creditors to file competing plans of reorganization at,
for example, the last day of the judicial reorganization.365 By allowing creditors to
cast their votes among plan alternatives, the process would become more
democratic. Moreover, in a Brazilian insolvency procedure, all creditors should
enjoy the same level of disclosure with which a bond issuer must comply when
issuing securities under the Securities Act.366 Furthermore, when the debtor seeks to
sell its business to a third party acquirer, the law should compel review by the court
and creditors or require a market test like an auction.367 As currently enacted, these
combined pitfalls in Brazilian law create an unfavorable environment for
international bondholders. Rather than reliably establishing a transparent process
that results in a fair and equitable outcome, the current law can result in
unbalanced negotiations slanted by brinksmanship. Reform in these areas will be
critical if Brazil wants to continue raising capital from U.S. markets and elsewhere.
Without such further reform, Brazil risks the same high interest rates and limited
access to capital that motivated Brazil to overhaul the antiquated concordata
process.
362. See Revised Judicial Reorganization Plan, D.J.S.P., Case No. 2009.000928-5 (Braz.).
363. See supra Part III.B. Alternatively, this problem could be mitigated through reform of the TIA. See
supra Part III.D.
364. See supra Part IV.
365. See supra Part V.B.
366. See supra Part VI.B.
367. See supra Part VII.B.
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